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METAPHYSICS 
The obJeot ot this paP!1J" 1s to p" •• ent JOItl .. R07co'a aoaoap-
tion 01' tbe bWl'lt'Il a.lt In bi8 metapbJa1cnl tralllbwoPk. It would bo 
Ot;st, then, to beS1ft b7 sl"lac a orler aketch .r Me _tapbJal0., 
1n.ot~ .a 1t pertalna to tn. n~n a.lt. rna wor4 ~t~eb(alc. 1. 
app.roprla" to. 1"8t ..... lna to hOJoe'. philo.o,*," ot belq, 81noa 
ROJoe olt:ar17 conO.1V68 ot be1n8 a. ao_t.b.1na })elond the pb7alcal, 
_~'!. !!. eigalka. !!Ct.~~ePlalc., toen, ••• 18 aore in kt,.plng wIth 
Royce' a attitude than the lION neutral word. ~Jlto10fl. H.·.over, 
HOJo.hi.elt trOlil tIme to t1 .. appllf;a tn. word .,-tae&a108 to hia 
cloctpine. 
I.t & tl:UAs 1. a a14 to bet real, exlatlna, &0118 notion 01' wbat 
18 meant br the ten belal ought to be made expllclt. Ia4eea, 
.t&,*-o.t. about ,..a1 tb.lnp wl11 be 81pItlcan' 1n proportIon to 
tbe 'Vl"ldnes. 01' nne'. oonceptlon ot being. fhWl, 1t 1s bJ no 
meau otloN to begin thle con.lderatlon ot tb8 hwar1 .elt PJ aaJ-
1Il8 that 1t ia a betlna. 1114" •• , tor olear ~lnEb 1t muat Ftt 
tile ott •• , be .. ked what 1. be1aJl tor HOT.e? 
The hi.t01'7 of phllo.opiq' aholl. tilat men have bad difitmetrl-
0"113' oppose. BotioQII ot ,,11&t It .~an. to be. Ii DI'I.t look Itt 
.OM such notlona *, lir1na to 11ght the divergenc1es. Paul 
1 
2 
'1'illich apeaks ot being a,8 fin eatNmgement i'roJU God ,flU;;, so, ns 
sln. ThoMa AquinA •• p~)nksor being as a good in itself (omne ena 
--
!!! .b.o.num __ >. Immanuel Kant formally exclude. being from his .ystem, 
fmd Benedetto Croce coes 80 incldental17. Bemal:'d Lonergan, S.J. 
stresses the iaomorph.1am bet.en being and mind. };.{fOrtin Heidegger, 
1n hi8 hermeneutio phenomenology, turns to tempornllt7 ... const1-
tutl.8 ot being Itself. 8ren Klekegaard s.es true being 01111 in 
the light ot the super-rational, and Wl1liam Ja.mes •••• being 01'117 
1n the world or natural practical1t7. 
ROTce tullJ appreoiate. that belng, as 1e evidenced in his-
torT, 1s not the ••• rcr all. He s •• s thB. t a.n,- .antng1'ul state-
~ent about the human .al1' demands both a oonslderation of the his-
torIcal meaninga .ppll~d to the term being and an unambiguous in-
dication of one'. own mean1n& tor tn. ter •• 
I shall dw.ll upon the nature ot Beina, bacauae to 
assert that God ls, or that the World i,., or eyen, 
with D.scartea, that I au1, implie,. that OIle knowa what 
it i,. to be. or In oth~r worda. what t~ ao-oalle4 
exlstential predicate itaelt Involve •• 
A. !!!! ~ Conoeetlona .2! Bel!J 
The various notlons ot belng are oonsidered b7 Horee under 
tour tTpea ot whleh be rejeots the .fIrst thre. and aocepts the last 
aa hi. own. nthe FoUl'~b. Conception or Belng." Our purpose heN 1. 
not to detend or to condemn R01ce 'e presentation ot the various 
schools ot ontology or to substantiate or to nullitJ hi. reaaona 
lJoalah ROJce. The World and the Individual, Vol. I {New York 
Dover PublIcations, !ric. I959).-p7 12: 
3 
ror rejection. What is needed now is to present his arg\.Ul'ents 
priefl1 so as to arrive at his conception of being, which is delin-
~at6d by his rejections of the first three conceptions. Before we 
consider Roycets handling of each type of ontology, it would be 
good to see how Royce lines them up with one anotherl 
But .first let me name all the four. The mere 
list will not be very enlightening, but it will serve 
to fUrnish titles for our Immediatel, subsequ.nt In-
quiries. The first conception I shall call the teoh-
nics.ll7 RealistIc definition of what it 1s to be. The 
second I shall call the Mystica.l conception. The third 
I cannot so easi17 name. I shall sometimes call it the 
typical view of modern Critical Rationalism. Just now 
I prefer to name it by its foraulatIon, the conception 
of the real as the Truth. or. in the present day, usu-
ally, as the EmpirIcally verifiable Truth. The fourth 
I shall call the Synthetic, or the constructively Ideal-
istic conception of whet it is to be. For the first 
conception, that is real which is simpl1 Independent of 
the mere ideas that relate or that ma.J' rere £8 to ii. 
For this View, vrhat is, Is not only external to our 
ideas of it, but absolutely and independentl1 decides 
as to the validi t,. of such ideas. It controls or de-
te~nes the worth of ideas, and that wholly apart 
from their or our desire or will. What we "merely 
think" makes "no difference" to fact. For t he second 
conoeption, that 1-s real which i. absolutely and 
tinally IIml.edIate, so that when it is found, i.e. 
felt, it altogetner end. any effort at ideal defini-
tion, and in this sense satisfies ideas as well as 
constitutes the fact. For thIs view, therefore, Being 
is the longed-for goal of our desire. For t he third 
conception, that 1s real which is purely and s1mply 
Valid or True. Abav e all, acoording to the modern 
form of this View, that is real which Experience, in 
verifying our ideas, shows to be valid about these 
ideas. Or the real is the valid "Posaibili ty of Ex-
perience. II But for the fourth conception, that is 
real which finally presents in a comple~ed ex~ rience 
the whole meaning of a System of Ideas.~ 
2Ibid ., pp. 60-61. 
-
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1. Realism 
The first type, the Realistic, places great stress on inde-
pendence as a c.riterion ror being. A major d1atinction is vade, 
according to this school, between the "that II of a being am its 
Ii what • ft ImaginaIT beings ha ve a "what ft but no If tha t. tf If a being 
is independent of the idea (or concept) proper to it, then it has 
a ftthatl\; it 1s real. What a thing i8, then, does not signi.f7 that 
it is. 
Truth, 1'or the Realist, lies independent of man fa apprehen-
sion. To get to it, man must e.oape from his mental contines. To 
get tc it, man must escape from his mental oonfines, which are im-
posed upon him a.r the nature of his inner life of consciousness. 
The Realist conceives of a oleavage between the conceptual activ-
ity has no effect Whatsoever on the existential world. 
Now the first of our tour conceptions of what it is 
to be real, essentially declares that if you thus 
know a real obJeot, and it thereupon your knowledge 
vanishes from the world, that vanishIng ot your 
knowledge mskes no dlffererloe, except by accident, 
or Indi.rectly, to the real object that yeu know.3 
The real, according to this first concepti on of being, 1s a 
given; it 1s not produced by any activity on man's .part. Of course 
the real Is not lImited just to what can be.ensed. for it mar be 
an Intelllgibilit1 whicb appears through senaible media. The real 
18 grasped in ideas when those ideas escape anr subjectIve prede-
termination. 
The aot or Motdlng itself js a rE>allt7, sinell it hela in it-
~elt an Intellls101l1t1 whioh 1. Independent or a,~ extrinsl0 ob-
~I!'trver who vlew. the a..ot as an obJeot or hia knowing. 
Henoe the objeota of reallatio ontoloft7 are objects 
not neoe.aarlly oui.alde or J! knovledse wb.ate"er, 
butt~l1 i~~~~~q~ 2!..!& • o~l!!1. ~ !!. externe:l 
to uem8t! ve •• 
- , 
.ten rlnd it 8001&117 convenient to be .re.l~.ta. tot- then the, 
~an keep otber men and th1ng8, by ronalla ot ab8tt'"act oatogo!'l •• , 1n 
~n order which 1- ln4ependent of theIr peraonal &lotions. Thetr 
polee in _oclety. then. aN aroitrary In tbf."t tho, can pcu.,tlo1pate 
~. the" will. The conservatlve m.nd 1. apt to accept reall_ be-
~aus. it ~.erve8 order in 8ooi6t,. Ind •• 4, tn. realiat holda up 
~h18 8001al order aa .. proof tor hl. ontologieal .,at.m, on whioh 
~ tend. to take a poaltlon which perauades ra.tl~r tl».n demo.n-
.trat ••• 
"0108 f'incl. tile Roali. t '8 poa 1 tl on ()1' leola t1 nb ttlf: know~r 
~OJll the known bard to accept. InCie". hit .r •• la that the atriot 
~lchotOlQ' between the l1lental and exlatel!t1al ord.r 1.nvolve. con-
~rad1.ct l ona. 
It !J.eallar4l contradiots 1. ta own concept.i ,"18 1n 
uttering til... It a •• erta t be DlUtual dependence or 
imowlna and or Being In tt» vet'1 act 01' deolaring 
Belna 1ndependent.) , 
In the exiatttnti .. 1 crder, •• erJ being which .xlatlll t" fin 
~d1v!dual. In the mental order, 8"8.1'1 ooncept 18 a unIveraal. 
4I b14., p. 69. 
-S Ibld., p. 76. 
-
6 
Once the Realist has made the two orders independent, he can never 
have them united again. "Its /Jfealism'illa:ws, as universals, con .. 
tradict Its .facts, which have to be independent individuals." 6 The 
abstract thinking of the Realist does not depict the real individ-
ual but, at best, gives some linkage ror systems or facts. The ex-
istent, even for the Realist, is a noumenon, which is itself a con-
capt determined bY' a tb.1nking process. Even tr..8,t which is con-
ceived as being totally independent of the mind is in .fact defined 
by mind. 
Royce teels that realism cannot claim to have real knowledge 
ofaxistentia~ facts. He says: "Its ~ealIsm'!7 central technical 
difficulty ••• is that wondrous proble. of the nature of individ-
ua1it,.. and as to the meaning of universals.ft.7 Further, that knowen 
are independent from one another, Ro,'ce feels, is contradicted b7 
experience. "This L!fea1isti!7 vie~ of the social re1"lt ion • • • 
is contradic ted b7 ever,.. case ot the communicati on of mind w:!.th 
min,d. ,,8 Independence here ~an8 that the knowers in knowing have 
no ef'feet on one another. 9 Independence in general means, for 
Royce, being devoid of relations. 
2. Mzaticism 
R07ce proceeds to the second conception of Being, My'stieism. 
6I 'bid. 
-
? !.2!.:!. 
8 Ibid. , 
-
p. 13. 
9 ~., p. 61. 
7 
~his 1s the anoient opponent ot Realism. In itselt M7sticism is 
more religious than philosophical, out underlying it is a de:finite 
philosophy. Many disregard MysticisM because, they teel, it sub-
~titutes tee lings :for realitJ. But theJ Yiew it externally from a 
realist's position and, so, do not trulJ understand Mystioism. 
The philosophioal Mystic, u8uallJ, is one who has begun in 
Realism but then, since he found contradiotions in it, has come to 
~oubt it. The Mystic teels that ideas are talse precisely because 
~hey are just ideas and not the reality. Reali t1 is not to be f'o\.lJ! 
~n profound 1deas, but in the profundity of' experience. The'rea1, 
ror the Mystic, can be had only immediately, that 1s, without the 
~dium 01' ideas. "Or in other words, Reality 1s that which lOU can 
urlUediately teel when, thought sa~isfied, JOu cease to think. ,,10 
Royoe oalls the Mystic the only true empiricist, tor the 
Mystic holds that all truth 1s to be found immedlate1.7. Tila knower 
and the known mUll t become one for true knowledge. BeC8US e 01' that. 
thought is a detect, Ii step awa,. f'rom rea1ItJ in the d irecti on 01' 
illusion. 
It It takes a trance to tind such a tact, that is the 
fault of our human ignorance and baseness. The tact 
in question i8 alwals in lOU, is under your eles. The 
inef'1'&b17 immediate 1s always present. Onl,., 1n lOur 
blindness, you retuse to look at it, and preter to think 
instend of illus1ons. The ineffably' immediate is also, 
1f you 11ke. f'ar above lClow1edge, but that 18 becaUS!l 
knowledge ordinarily maans contamination with ideas. 
lOIbld., P. 8). 
-
llIbid. 
-
8 
The ~b'8t two conceptions ot being, whicb we have thus tar 
~onsiderad, are polar opposites to each other.12 Weither satisty 
~a.rce becHuse each presents in abstract terms onlT tragmentarr 
views or reality. We will now look at R07cets reo.etlon to each. 
R01ce puts a question to the Realist: 
Does 70ur world conta1n In just this sense Many 
difterent, that ls mutually lndependent beings, 
or does It contain onl7 One real being, whose inner 
struct~r., perhaps simply, perhaps in£in1te17 cam-
plex, !jl11 permits of no mutual independence ot 
pHrts. 
The Realist is now In a dilemma. Whichever horn he choos.s, 
Royce teels that he can logicallY' lead the Realist to inconsist-
encr· 
First, the Realist says that reality ia made up ot m&nJ 
beings. It should be recalled that tor the Realist a being is that 
which is Independent, in itself', epart f'rom othera. R07ce now asks 
the Reallst that leads h1m to 8a'1 that beinga are independent. The 
Realist replies that one aees In his experience that beings are in-
dependent. True, the Realist adds, independent beings do enter in-
to relation with each other, e.g., through causality or love. That 
relation, indeed, is a f'act, a reality, and as such it too is in-
dependent. How then, asks R07ce, can a thI:rd independent bind two 
other independents.14 Obvious17. it oannot. 
12Ib1d ., p. 86. 
-13 123. Ibld. , p. 
-
l4I2!!., p. 128. 
9 
The Realist has turned to experience tor evidence ot his as-
lertion that beings are many and independent. precisely here, in 
~xperience, Royce teels that he has the Realist. 
But now I dietinctly decline to admit that, in our 
concrete hurilan experience, you can ever show me any 
physically real objects which. are 80 independent of 
other that no change in ~ne of them need correspond 
any change of the other. !> 
two 
each 
to 
Whe laws of physics, as well as ethnical and ethical laws, indicate 
~hat there is a tight solidarity in the universe. Hmuan experience, 
then, aeems to give evidence against the Realist. Furthermore, 
~oyce .flatly states that the Realist 1s wrong in thinking that be ... 
~ngs are originally independent and then later enter into a rela-
~ion. Onets awareness is What changes. 
What happens when' we 8 ay that the1 pass from mutual 
ihdependence to linkage, 1s reallj that we find them, 
in our experience, passing fron1 relations Whose import-
ance is merely to U8 le.8 obvious, into relations of 
more obvioua human interest. But now the relations of 
an object in 0lginary experience make parts of the 
object itsel.f. 
The Realist muat admit now that beings cannot be man)" a.nd, 
ao, completely independent of one another, for it i8 seen in ex-
perience that beings are related. Since a being must be independ-
ent and s1nce th1ngs are related in the world, the Realist would 
say that reality 1s just one being. However, Royce points out that 
~onlsm is impossible tor a Realist. "For let us remember that, as 
lSIbid., p. 125. 
-l6~., p. 126. 
10 
we observed betore, there are already at least Two genuinely and 
absolutely independent real Beings in the realistic world. h17 The 
Rea11st must at least 8ay that the real and his idea ot it are bota 
beings. Since they are independent o~ one another, they must be 
considered separate realities. But it the Realist's idea about tne 
real 1s independent ot the real, it cannot truly be an idea about 
the roe.l. 
The realistic theory, then, as we now know, by its own 
explicit consequences, and just because its real object. 
are totallJ independent or its idea., has nothing to do 
with any independently real object, and has no relat10n 
to the iffJependent external world that its own ac.count 
defIne •• 
At this point, the Realist b1 the logical interences in his own 
doctrine has nothing as the Object othis ph11osophT. "In brief, 
the realm ot a consistent Real18M 1s not the realm at one nor yet 
the realm of Man,., it is the realm or absolutely lfothlng."l9 
Ifo doubt, the realists among the readers will have ready 
man,. counter-arguments to Meet Royce'. reasoning. They w1ll prob-
ab11 agree with William James when he re~erred' ,to Royce' B Realist 
20 
as: "what an ass o~ a reallst. tt But whether Royce has depicted 
the Realist as belng too naive or not Is not the conce~ here. 
Rather, only a brief look at Royce'8 'fiaw on :realism is t.~a.nted, in 
Vol. 
l1Ib1d., p. 133. 
-
181bid., p. 136. 
19IbId., p. 137. 
-
20R• B. Parr", The Thougnt and Character of William James, 
I (Bostont L1ttIi"; Brown, aii'Ocomp&llJ, 191$), p. 818. 
11 
order to have a better understanding of what he will mean b,. his 
'Fourth Conception of Being. It 
The Mystic defines reallt7 as that which 18 one with the 
~nower. The unconsoious Absolute becomes a"ra.!:'. ot itself in ita 
rinite aspects. At firat, men falsely see themaelves as distinct 
from their objects. Than, as ~stica, tne,. oome to • stage of 
~mmedi.ac7 whioh satisfies all their ideas. Royce cannot bear with 
~he aura of Illusion about ~~stici8m. 
It follows that it M1sticism is to escape trom 
its own finitude, and really la to mean by its absolute 
Being an7thing but a Mere Noth1ng, ita aocount ot Being 
~st be so amended as to Involve the assertion that our 
fin.1te life is not mere illUSion, that our ideas lu'e not 
merely talse, and that2le are already, even as finite, :tn touch w1th Reality. 
The Absolute for the Mystic has reality only in relat10n to 
~he c9nscious striving of the finite Jward the Absolute. Pure 
mnediac1 with the Absolute 1s the Mystio's goal. To achieve it 
pe must renounce the illusions ot his finite consciousness. In so 
~oing he renders not onl, himself nothing, but the Absolute as wel~ 
••• we bring the mystic's case to its close, by 
pointing out that his Absolute. in its abstraction, 
is preoisely as much. and in exaotly the same sense 
of the terms a NothiD§! as, by his hypothesls, his 
ow~ oonsoiousness is. 
~. Critical Rationalism 
The Third Conception of'" being identl.f1.es being with validity. 
Phat is valid which tits in a .formal syste~. Its original exponent 
The World and the Individual, I, 182. 
--- --- --- ----------
21Royce. 
22Ibid ., p. 
-
195. 
12 
23 is Kant. A sharp separation is made between noumena and pbenam-
ena. By that separation the Critical Rationalist hopes to avoid 
the presumptions of" other philosophies. 
The truth, validi.t,-, or determina.te possibility' of the 
experienoe in question, may be, so far as yet appears, 
either transient 01' eternal, either relative or a.bsolute, 
either something valid for a limited group or people, or 
something valid ror all possible rational beings. But 
in any case, this third definition of Being attempts to 
identity the validit;r or the ~qea with the true Being of" 
the fact defined b.r the idea. 4 
Ro;rce links many prominent phIlosophers with thI* ThIrd Con-
oeption of aeing: st. Augustine in identItJing Goa. with Veritas, 
St. Thomas in relating the Divine Ideas to God, Plato in holding a 
realm of essences, Aristotle in having the notion of possible be-
ing.25 
Precis ely on the central theme of the Third Conception, on 
the Identif"ioB.tion of validit;r and being, Hoyce finds fault. 
Now what our Third Conception so far fails to explain 
to us is precisely the difference between the realit;r 
that is to be attributed to the valid truths that we 
do not get concl~etely verIfied in our own experience, 26 
and the reality observed by us when we do verify ideas. 
FUrthermore, since being appears only universally for the Third C~~ 
ception, tne selt knowing cannot be a being. But the self, which 
certainly is individual, must be a being to ground, as the knower, 
24~ •• 
2~Ibid. , 
26 
-Ibid., 
p. 221. 
pp. 228-29. 
p. 260. 
1.3 
~he being ot his id8as.27 The Third Conception ot Being actual17 
~oes not la7 cla1m to know an7 reali t7 which would be mOl'e than a 
~onstructian 01' the mind. Given the human situation, man at best, 
according to the Third Conception, can come to a clarity of thought~ 
B1 retleoting on the struoture of his mind, man oan a ee his process 
of categorization. Then, he ce,n more precisely clasai17 his data. 
Since all men have the I ame mental structure, the greater the pre .. 
cision in thinking the greater will be the un1tormit,.' in the com-
munity ot human knowledge. 
But I point out t.ba t the 1r real! ty, t he true Be ins ot 
these obJeots, is in no wise detined when you merely 
speak ot the ideas as nothing but valid, becaua. the 
assertion ot validity i8 so tar merely the assertion 
ot a correspondence between a preauppoaed idea and ita 
assumed object, without any account as y~e either ot 
the object, or ot the truth ot the idea. 
The critical rationalist is satisfied in canceiving reality 
in an ftaa it" manner. He teels that although one can never know 
the really real one can pretend as it he doe., becauae practical 
living demands such a preten.e. 
Our oritical rationali.t live. in a world where nothing 
in the realistic sense is real, but where it is as if 
there were independent realities, which, wIii"nmore -
clo.e17 examined, pr!,e to be merely more or less valid 
and permanent ideas. 
4. !!!. Szpthesis 
The oonsiderations ot the previous three conceptions ot beinE 
27Ib1d., p. 261. 
-
28Ib1d ., p • .352. 
-
29Ib1d., p. 24.3. 
-
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lead to Roycets own conception, the Fourth. In it he has 1ncorpo-
rated the signif1cant elements of the other conceptions. At the 
~ame time, he feels, he has by meana ot his synthesis overoome the 
~ontradictions which are the logical outcome of the other concep-
~ions of being. 
The real, for Royce, cannot be an isolated fact. It cannot 
~e a total17 independent other. It oannot be an und1fferentiated 
one. It cannot be a valid universal. The real is a unique, unlf1~ 
~1stem of idea., which are embodiment. of will in that their exist-
~nce is their purpose. "What is, or what is real, is as such the 
complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of 
the internal meaning of f1nite ideas."30 
Por Royce, 1dea do •• not mean just a repr •• entation. Rather 
it is also an embod1ment ot purpos.: 
But the primar, character, wh1ch make. 1t an Idea, 1. 
not this 1ts repreaentat1ve character, 1s not ita vicar-
ious assumption of tha res pona1bili t1' of atanding foft a 
being beyond 1tselt, but 1s ita 1nner cnaracter aa re-
latively fultI111ng the purpose (that 1a, as present1ng 
the pafttial tultI~nt ot the purpose), which i8 in the 31 
consc10usness of the moment wherein the idea takes place. 
The meaning of an idea haa two aspecta: the internal and 
the external. Th. internal meaning refeft. to the subjective aspect 
of the idea, i ••• , the reason Vhf the knower wishes or wIlls to 
~ave this particular idea. 
30Ibid ., p. 339. 
-
31Ibid., p. 24. 
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Now this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present 
conscious embodiment in the contents and in the form 
of the complex state oalled the idea, constitutes what 
I shall hereatter oall the Internal Meaning of the Idea.32 
The external meaning refers to the objective aspect of the idea, 
1.e., to external reterent of the idea. For example, in the state-
ment "John loves Mary," the external meaning i. the fultilment at 
Johnts wish to love this unique person, M~. At first, the ex-
ternal meaning aeems to tran.cend completely the 1nternal.33 How-
ever, Royce .ee. a defint te cont1nuIt,.. be tweel1 the two meanIngs. 
Indeed, the external actually has significance only as an internal 
meaning. 
In other words, we shall 1'i nd .i ther that the external 
meaning is genuinel,.. continuous with the internal mean-
ing, and is inwardly involved in the latter, or else 
that the idea has no external meaning at 811.34 
We shall assert, in the end, that the tinal meaning ot 
e"e17 complete idea, when r ully developed, must be viewed 
a. wholly an internal meaning, and that all apparently 
external meanings become consistent with internal mean-
ings on17 bJ virtue of thus coming to be viewed· as a .... 
pect. at the true internal meaning.J~ 
Mary in her internal meaning 18 the determined correlate to 
John's internal meaning. So, in thIs lense, Mary is by no mean. 
a neutral objeot with respect to the active 8ucject, John. Rather, 
both in accord with their own internal meanings act harmoniousl,... 
321bio., p. 25. 
-
331bid. , p. 27 
-
34Ibid., p. 33. 
-35Ibid., 
-
p. 34. 
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In other words, Mr~y has external meaning for John only becauae of 
her and hi. internal meanings. 
Reality, then, is the fulfilment of will,36 for, it will be 
seen, will determines internal meanings. The intellect in seeking 
the truth of being must look for sn appreciat1.on of the internal 
meaning of being. 
A will concretely embodied in a 11fe,--and these meanings 
identical wi th t he very purposes tba t our poor fleeting 
finite ideas are even now so fragmentarily seeking, amidst 
all their flickerings nnd th~ir conflicts, to express,--
this, I say, i. the reality.J7 
In his Pourth Conception, Royce think. that he haa incorpo-
rated the good points of the other conceptions. With his synthesil 
he has overoome the intrinsic contradiotions of the others. 
Realism in its definition of being has laid great weight on 
"other. tt "otb.ertt assumes the authority over ideas. "Other" is 
the cri ter~, Qn for truth or falsi ty. Royce agrees with t he Realist 
in that "other" is a constitutIve of • finite idea. "The finite 
idea does seek ita own Other. tf38 However, this "other" is not 
something totally independent ot the tinite ide. (nor, also, ot 
the one Who has the idea)~' The1r being, that ot tM "other" and 
that of the idea, is so bound together that it cannot be separated 4 
(This will become clearer 1n connection with the Absolute.) "Yet 
the ldea 8ubm1 ts to no external :meaning that is not the developmen1 
36Ibld., 
-
II, 432. 
37Ibid 
_" 
I, 359. 
38Ibld., p. 353. 
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,r its own roe~ning. ,.39 Clearly, the idea 1 s dependent on the 
other" for its whatnesa and the fact that it is. Not so clear now 
p~rh!:tps, is that the "other" is dependent on the idea for both its 
~hatnes8 and its existence. The "other: however, achieves its pur-
'OS8, and so haa ita baing, only ns fulfilling its own internal 
~aning. It ita internal meaning is precisely- to be the complenlent 
,,0 a tini te idea, then It 1a dependent on that idea tor ~. ts whatne. 
Lnd its exiatence. 
The opposite pole ot Real1s., Mysticism, has held to the com-
plet. Identiflcation ot being in one. The }Pourth Conception of 
Being atressea, also, the l.mity of being in that everything that is 
is a fulfIlment of purpose which flows trom the one will of the 
~b.olute. Thua, the mystical identification of the world aad the 
Absolute Self bas been in a modified form incorporation into the 
Fourth Conception. 
The Pourth Oonception of Being agree. with critical rational-
lsm in that being gives validit7 to 1deas. "The valid finite Idea 
is first. far whoever possess it, an observed and empirieal fulfil-
D1EIl t of puppose. "40 However, the Fourth Conoeption would not equR 
the idea with the "other.- Iadeed, precise17 insofar .s the "othel 
Is not defIned, juat so tar it 1s not that finite idea and i8 the 
"other." The nothor" haa 11;s own intemal meaning wh1ch, it w111 
be seen is derived from Will. 
39I b1d., p. 354. 
-
4oIbid., p. 3$6. 
-
What therefore you bave not thus defined is precise17 
the Being or the objeot all other than the very finite 
idea which is to regard It as an other. It' YCHl have 
once observed thi. derect ot &nJ aasertion ot a bare 
poss! bili t7 of experience, you will have seen \i'l'\Y the 
mere det1nition ot universal types can never reach the 
expression ot tne whole nature ot real Beings, and w~, 
tor that very res8on, the realm ot ValIdity 1s nothIng 
unlea. It 18 more than m.erely valid, nothing too unless 
it takes an individual form ~~ an unique fulfilment ot 
purpose in a oompleted llf'e.Ji. 
18 
[.ChQ real cannot be sati.ried by universals devoid ot volitIonal 
charaoteriatic •• 
The essenoe ot the Real is to be Ind! vidual, or to perm1t 
no other ot its own kind, and th1s charact~r 1t posseasea 
only as the unique fulfilmen t ot plU'pOa8. 4 
Iiis diasa.tisi'action with the other concept1ons ot being haa 
lead ROTC. 1nto his own oonception. In this framework, will gives 
realltr its significance, which intelleot must appreoiate. The 
real, then, ia freed trom intellectual aostraction. The real, to 
be real, JIlWJt be individual, just as the will in willIng must will 
~niqu.lJ a unique tultllm6nt of Its wIlling. 
This final form of the idoa, this final object sought 
when we .eek Being, 18 (1) a complete expression of the 
internal m.!oaning of the .finIte Idea with wh1ch, 1n an,. 
oa.8, we start our questJ (2) a complete fulfilment ot 
the will or purpose partiall,. &mbodied in this idea; (l) an individual lite tor whIch no other can be sub-
atituted.43 
Wi th. this .ketoh of Royce t s me taph1'1J ias, 1 t 1 Ii hoped tha. t the , 
presentation of hla notion of" the individual h.uman salt will be 
41101d., pp. 357-58. 
-
42I bld., p. 348. 
-
43Ibid •• pp. 340-41. 
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more intelligible. Also, in the course ot the presentation it i. 
hoped that the Fourth Conception ot Being will become more meaning-
tul, especiallT as the tunction ot the Absolute is brou6ht to light 
We can t.beret~ 18.1 a81de altogether our ifs and then., 
our yaliditz and our other such terms, whiilwe speak of' 
this tina! conoept or Being. What is, Is tor WI no 
longer a mere Porm, but a Lite; and in our world of what 
was before more truth tte lIght ot. Indi vldualit1 and ot 
will have tlnal~ begun to sb1ne.44 
B. Abaolute--tlntte Eolaritz 
!bD relatIon b.~.rwe.n tt. Absolute and finite beings must now 
be reviewed. Since the h'tUl1f:l.n sEll,f takes on its true significance 
only in rel~tion to the Absolute, 80me understanding of tnat rela-
tion must be had. Is Royce here speaking in tl~ context of logic, 
of epistemology, of ps¥,chology, of religion, or of metaphysics? 
In some sense be i. in each context. He is in a metaphySical con-
I 
text when he talks of the Absolute--finite relation. 
All tinite beings are expressions of the Absolute. The Abso-
lute 18 the integral whole of U18 finite beinGs. The fInite bains 
haa Ita existenee cnl7 as fulfilling trult role in the total ex-
pression whieh the Absolute wills to it. FOr free bein~, the per-
fect expression ot the Absolute's will is their ideal selves. The 
Absolut~ i8, t~!l, ccmplete17 immanent in the finite expression •• 
NeYertheless, the Absolute is not dependent on anI particular fi-
nite being or grnup ot beings tor ita existenoe or its form. It 
finds 1 t8 expression In the finite beings. The form of the total 
44Ibid., p. 342. 
-
jexpreaat.OD anI5 tbat 1t ex1sts at all, how.vt>r, 1. cont1rlf:)ent OIl tbe 
IAbsolute'a will. abouU a tree aaCtt tetl 1ft aoh1evl1l6 its Ide.l 
•• It, tb.8 Abaolute oOJlPGns.' •• 1'01' th" corN.PODding void tn tta 
~xp:re •• 1Oft tlu-oup anoth*r .rlD1te be1na. 
ro be. we haV$ •• td. meum. tc tult!l a £u!i?0 ••• in hot, 
'to l'U1tl1 1n t1niil, 1rul1vldti'il" '.xlweailon, £1ii ~b_ pu-
la ...... .na·t:a8lJ, the tbaolu.te pw.*po... OUI' clo •• r--atudJ 
kula shown us tba t thi. Absolute purpoae 1. not unl¥ an., 
but_lli,,> intInItel,. cOMplex, 110 that Ita \lilt t7 1s the 
unItT ot JitW7 Wl11_, IiUlCtb. oae of' wtdoh tInda 1t. ox-
pres.loa In tA.n trtd1 vldual lite, while theta. 11".e, aa 
tbe 11vEl8 of ., ••• 10us a.lvee. bav(t ali 8.fipeot 1n Mblch 
tbey au'. tree, !.n eo rill' fiB each, whlle 1n ~ asp.ota 
determ1ne4, 1. atiell 1n lta own t1ft .. un.~re a det.l"Idne~ 
or all the "$t. f~5 
A::'l 1nterMl _an1nsa ot ide.ta. then, fWfi aub.UI1ted W1MP tbt 
Abaolute '$ wll1. AU external _aning. ltt-6 ult1_tel.,. .ienttle_' 
only 1n tOrtl8 or tnt.mal _&Ull~ t Whiob arts h.ttrmon1aed In the oae 
wIll ot the Absolute.. -rhu.s, all _anina In the Mo!"ld nov,. tZ'OI1 
the ,tb.olut... who will. ·10 expre •• 1.0Il, whicb 1. 1tuelt .. to be BUob. 
na It 19 ~r will he • 
. . ~ 1. tho Abaolute, ~oat:.e 1n the b,tes-rrelat1crwbipa 
Of(i'ontr'a~t6d Euc.preaa1one of at. single \-1111 lie. the oDl,. 
oppos-turd tl tQ~ UlfIl embocl1Mn t ot wholenes. ot 11te, and 
tor the poa ••• aion of SCllf-oonaclouentu,. bl tnt! AhfS(\lute. 46 
'.[10 be 4\ be1.n t,. then Inplle!l uniquenesD ~Uld lndlv14u.allt7. A 
[beiDg 1s ~17 insofar aa It fulfils a p'lrtloulu purpo8t1 ot the 
!\,osolu.t... Sinee fl purpos. mWJt be unique R.!~d individual, an cx-
prcDsion or th&t purpo$etluet be unlq,oo tI.na individual. Wit.hout 
4>lb14., II, ))$-)6. 
401~ld., p. 336. 
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udquene.a with respect to purpo •• there can be no indIvIduatIon. 
_lnce beings cbvloualJare indIYiduated on the fIn1te level aa ex-
~r.8.1ons, the,. muat be unique. 
Indivlduals are. all va~lous 
In so far is tney are Many, 
ls individual, everT ~.p.ct 
expres8ion 18 unlque.~1 
expresaloma ot the Absolute, just becauae_ where the One 
and element ot its •• 1£-
The Absolute 1s in eternity, wluoh ia the totalIty ot tlm •• 
past, present, and tuture. The tinlte expression ls essentlall7 
lIemporal; that i8 to sa." it is always lImited to a particular tIll. 
For the a ake ot clarificatIon, a parallel CUl be made. fba 
~bsolute ls like a man; th~ finite exprossions are l1ke the DIan's 
ldeas. The man freely choos •• hia. 1deaa(he at least haa tr.edom ot 
exerc1se) • The ideas make the man who he is. Ultimat.q, the Id". 
ape on17 tor the sake ot the roan, that ne lQ.ay be with suoh a deter-
~ination or form. Of tbem3~lves. the ideas are noth1ngJ the,. ba •• 
~o Significance but in relntlon to the lllfUl. The man's oonsclous-
ness of hluelf transcends any partioular m.oment of being_ The 
Ideas are lecated. in tirllf). The man knows his Idea.s ln x'elatlon to 
a time _ The )Jilin would be d1fferent it be had cho.en a dirt.ren' 
Ide. or set of' ideals. Thus, the man Is independent of anJ par-
ticular ideas, whereas the 1deas are totally dependent on the man. 
However" the n18l1 needs ideal to express hi. sel1"hood, to be himaeltl-
Admittedly, the above parallel hRS much of the tone of pay-
chologJ in it. However. it should be kept in mind tbat Royce 1a 
not a aeallst. He 18 an Ideallst. ~o be is to be an expreaaion 
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of the frbsolute, to be, in a sense, his Idea, whioh fulfIls a pur-
pose that the ~bsolute wIlla for him8elt. In such a tramework, th 
reali.t's clear-cut d'.stInet101'1 between the purely pS'1ohologioal 
and the ontologioal fades. Thu8, what sounds like psychol()g7in 
the realist's terminology i. actually metaphysical in ROToets. 
ot course, the parallel limps. ~he so-called ideas ot the 
Absolute, I.e., finite beings, can beve their own consciousness ftn 
powe .. to will. IJ!hst Ie pcasible because the Absolute has 80 wl11e 
thia expresslon. Indeed, ROTce would 8 a:y tb.a t perhaps thlngs to 
whlch we do not ordinarlly attribute oon801018n •• 1 !letua 117 ln t 1» 
Iche. other than the b.u:me.n he:,e conaolouaneal. If .. ,. were to ex ... 
perlenoe a rullion 7ears aa Ii manent, then, perhaps, so-culled in-
animate things 'Hould seem to he. ve consciousM8 s. Sinee to be i8 t· 
.fulfil purpose and since the purpose 1n the an'_:m9.1 kingdom is ful-
filled by the speoles rather than the individual, then. ~rhap8, 
viewed in a dIfferent scheme an animal species as fl. unit would tak 
on the characteristios ot a person. 
hardly the ohiet conce~na or Royce. 
But such speculations are 
Primar1lr, he ie Interes~ed 1 
the human pe7scn. whoa. eonsoiouene88 we experience in ourselves 
an d 1n other l!'18n. 
c. World!?! APErecia tl on--World .£! Desari2tlon 
R07ce divides the world otmen into two aspects. One 1s the 
World o.f Apprecle.tlon;: the other is the World ot Description. 
The \f!orld ot Appreo1at1on ls that ot aternal meanlne. The 
t7U8 reallt7 ot a being 1. It. Internal meanina. 
•• ~pJ'8ssi_ ',of". Absolute'. w1ll that bein 
Insotar as he ls 
i. an ontolo cal 
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reality. Thus, if one i8 to appreciate reality he must become 
aware of the internal meanings of things. Indeed, if one is to 
appreciate himself as a self he must become aware of hie own In-
ternal meaning, as an expre ssi on of the Absolu.te. When one dO~8 
become aware of his ideal self' as it 1s determined b,. the Absolutfll, 
then snd on11' tOtn can he make real progress in his self-develop-
ment. '.Chen and onl,. then 1s he consclous of himse If as belongins 
to the World of Appreciation. 
It 18 known trom psychology, aD! indeed from common exper-
ience, that ohilclJ .. n tend to have & selt-centered view ot ree.Jj.ty. 
The child sees things and persona onl,. 1n relatlon to hlmself. 
Only atter a long and arduous per10d oJ: maturation, whlen lasts his 
whole 11fetime, does the child become adu:&'t enough to 8 ee others as 
belngs-in-themselves. Of course, some al"Hays retain a childish 
view oJ: the world, that others 8.I'El only in rels"ti on to them. Such 
people usually spend their last days in prisons or, if they are ex-
trem. enough in their attltudes, in insane A..,.luma. 
The true world, the World of Values or of Appreoiation, 
as rightly viewed by an absolute insight, would be a 
world of H~l.es. forming in the unity or their 8ysteMS 
One Self. 
So strong i8 the egocentric attitude in rr\~m that onl,. after 
much attentlon to the reality of others does one come to an appre-
oiation of their internal meanings. One must transoend the exter-
nal meaning ot other, ln order to come to an appreolation ot other 
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as an expression of· the Absolute 1n ita own unlquones& find individ-
uality. In the statement, John loves Ms.,..,.. it waD pointed out, the 
external meaning was that Marya. being loved b1 John. Mary 18 the 
reterent for the idea, true; but .be is only insofa.r as she 1s lowe 
b1 John. John could love her for ro8.117 reasons, which would come 
out in the internal meaning of the atatement. John' a love would 
flctually be .elt-love if he does not tl'enscend to tb.e level of ap-
preoiation ror Mary in her othern.... To appreoiate Mar,y, John 
must become awaft or .her interonal meaning. That In1'inlte17 rich 
and intrioate meaning, which -il an integral part of the Absolute's 
expression of himsel..f, will nev.r be comprehended by Jolm. He 
must, nevertheless, approach .uch an appreciation of Mary, and ot 
ever7thing else, a180. Only in tbet way can he truly know reality. 
onl,. in that wa,. can he become himself. 
The World or Descroiptlon, theseomd aspect ot m.ai1 t s world, 
is the world of 801ence, or validity, ot universals. Man classl-
ties be1nga 1n the World of Description so tbet he can get a better 
hold on them. for hls own use8. Here the other i. seen onl,. as hav· 
ing, or possibly having, some relatlon to the l11IUl. Men agree among 
themaelves on their classltications for theaake of commruoodcation. 
Need leads them to categorize cert&in beings under a certain type. 
'llhus, In the World ot Description real1t,.. has a much watered down 
signiticance. The external meanlng, seen .s universal and perti-
nent to men 1n general, has the prominent position 1n the World ot 
Descr1pt1on. Nevertheless, it would seem thBt man,. men live in the 
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world or Description whole-heartedly withOut tile least inclining 
toward, the World or Appreci6IL tion. Theso li.en cannot develop them-
selvea aa men. The.r are livil~ 1n an unreal world of their own 
tcrmulation. 
The tru.ly human man will see the World of Description for 
what it 11$. He will 8ub1'l'dt to it.a conventions. He will organize 
data ot hi. aoienoe along the 11nea ot interest prescribed by the 
World of Description. However, the truly h'UlilaIl m.an will not be 
deceived into thinking that that is the whole of realitT. Indeed 
he will live hia lite in the World of Appreciation in oonJunotion 
with the Absolute. 
CHAPTER II 
THE KUMA. SreLP DEFIlED 
Deso&.rtc:s established the existence of the self by his tantOus 
ormula "coglt<?,. erio !!:!!!." or oourse, preselltlna; the bare exist-
the self sa.18 little ot ita nsture. Is tile self Ii unique 
ndlvidual, or i8 it a logical torm? Is it the swmnatlon ot its 
mpirical situations, or 1s it Ii transcendental absolute? 
ROloe ma1 be sa14 to have tollowed up Descartes' phrase wIth 
similar one: .!2 ~ quantum.!.2!2. When one in looking tor oer-
itude, tor ,..altt,-. sublatea the sana •• , 1111 tends to IdentitJ self 
lth thougbt or will. For R07ce, will is the keynote tor aelt. 
ow.ver. it i8 not a blind will. Somew.cat like Aristotle's telos, 
oyce r.~. vill .s an intrinsio constItutIve of the self and aa 
epending on intellectual understanding tor ita guld4nee. ROlce 
"om.bines the volitional and intellectual chAit.I·acter of' the aelf in 
concept ot purpose, whioh is the ultimate reality of the sel~. 
Kant aaw. too, that purpo •• is the highest unitylng principle 
that men t end to attribute the order about them to some purpose 
i ving Absolute. 
Tbis highest tormal un1t7. which rests solely on 
concepts ot reason, i& the purposive unity or things. 
The apeculati ve inter.at ot reason mak.es it necessaI7 
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to regard all order in the world •• It it had 1 
originated in the purpoae ot a supreme reason. 
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It wIll be •• en that R07ce doe. just that. .aut he does not bU17 
the s61f in &1 abstract system 01' valldlt7_ Royce is ever concern~ 
with the concrete; tor hIm, to be, one must be an 1ndividual. He 
strongly recoIls .trom phl1oaophicnl expl9.nations wh1ch are lacking 
in human1stic appreciatlon.2 
Now that there is, 1'1-om. t he .first ohapter, some notion ot 
Royoe's metaphysical orientation, this ohapter will present R07oe's 
detinition ot the human self. It will formulate Royce's def1nItion 
around three aspecta of the aeltl that the selt i. (1) 1ndivldual, 
(2) un1que, (.3) aelf-id.entlcal and sf:llt-ldentlt'"y"lng. Finally, then 
R01'Oe'lI own terM person will be applied to tao subsiatent human 
selt. 
The focHl point ot' this chapter is the person. A later chap-
ter 1~Till look to the relation between the person !I.lld the Absolute, 
between the person 8l1d his world and the total conmunitl, and alao 
the relation between persolls. 
The World and the IndivIdual, Vol. II oontains thB oore ot 
----- . .......-~ .. 
Ro)"ce'8 thought about the b:uman. selt. Perhaps, he may in later 
lWorks explicate the conaequencAs ot his metap~aIcs of the human 
selt with respeot to areas of social 11ving~ but, in the World and 
-
11mBanuel Xant, Crlti~ue ot Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
~ml th (London: Macmillan and 0'07, ~9), p. 560. 
2Josiah ROlce, The Spirit of Modern Philos0phz (Hoston: 
!Houghton, Mittlin andCOmpall1, 1~2), p. 2r;. 
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~ I!!~1.1ch.l!i\1. Vol.II. ate notion of tbe nUMll .elt 1. e ••• n'lal17 
expftu.d. In Me preface to the sa.ond Volume he lnd1ea~8 what 
h.e W1l1 •• ,.1 
From ttature thai •• leot;urt::a paas to Ule ~n Sftlt. 
Oharaoterlatl0 ot tAla p~ oC tlvt &,...-n" end of 
ppevloua atAt.B'JI)nt.s ot mJ 0'IIIli upon the aa_ topic, are • 
., ant1N w1111Q&n ••• to 1&7 .. ide .11 ••• ort10n of till 
existence of a aubat$l.llti.ltl Soul. r1¥ unr~e.rvt,d accept-
ance of the ewpl"'lc~.l evidence ru£ardi.~ the dependence 
or the Human f'.U, for l-.:;s tef-'!lporal or1sln. £(.)11 1 i.e 
d.volo~D.', Ana tor- Ita p .... rvkt!on 1n Ita present 
t'Ol"ll 0:'''' lite, upon phfei.citl rf,(i see1&1 cOfu:t1tlontl; ,md 
fill lnalatence tlw t yulo1.:.a a.l" •• can po.s.aa, In the 
whole OJ- Sa .. fN.,-rt at ttlltl1' lives, Ident,l(u.llr the JUtnt' 
•• p .. l ........ ~ OIle Self can originate, or can-
t4evelnp within ttnot.n.r Self, lind 8() thr:lt the 11"88 o~ 
varloya I.t" •• Cq be lnt.c:u"Wo".n. 1n tl» -.oa t eoaaplex 
way8. 
H0108 apPNo1at;es th .. tao' tnat ~h .. gl"flat6st atuub11ns block 
1;.0 an idea11stic pbllc"epi1J is tile problerlt of' lntUv1duah1on.4 How-
.VElI', hAt reels tru, t much of the l1~ouncl hfUl Offen el~a.l'8d in bi. PI ... 
Volwu. He ",111 expreae hi. notion or the hUl'lan aelt 111 M8 .ta-
pnys10al tl'fAlMwovk. Th1a chapteJII ,,1111 t17. then, to look w1th 
toyoe flS betocsua ••• tbl mUllilUl aolf'. "'rAe tOl'"tMi1" leotures tmlpha-
ai.sed tn. W<»"14; the pre$c:rtt Gour •• t:t1all hil d1r.cted to\>"arda an 
IUlde:ratandllla ot the HW'MII In4! v1dual. !·S 
Indl'tldual 
.,. 1. 
"'he b.~ .elf for HOloe 1* an lnd1 vldUlll. Al thoug~ such aD 
~Q.liht 1'fIJJ7 .eem trlte to t:n. laTIJ!lAn, to tbo •• 140M aoquainted with 
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tile llistor1 ot phl108ophl the insight i8 of consequence. The ulti-
mate realitl of th6 human person, from Kant through Resel, has 
evolved as the transcendelltal ego. 11ho tr&.1'l8 oendental ego, strip-
ped of all the individuating characteristics ot the empirical ego, 
weld.s the reality ot men into a one. What is nonsenae to the 187-
man ot everyda1 experience is &ean b.r the philosophers a8 a bril-
liantly worked out logical system, which can hardlJ be disoardeu 
with a word ot rebuttal. 
ROTC., who was tullT aware ot the doctrlnea of hi. predeces-
sora, bas eo_ out boldlr in the opposite direction. ROJ'oe aaTs 
that tor anything to be real it must be indivldual.6 Indeed. the 
ult1Jnate reality of a being 1. found 111 his indlviduali",. io 
tranacendental sphere, whare content 1. spurned in order to get 
some pure form, 1. the seat of the real tor Rorce. 10 universal 
nature, which .tanda aloot from the concrete perta.tiona at tinite 
man, is given a8 the real trutn of man by ROTce. Royoe, tore. 
Skuldowlng the e:rlatentials, has gIven to the concrete individual 
the prime place in reality. 
What is the principle ot individuation for fio70e? At a deepe 
lev.l,the question maJ b. phrased: what is the principle ot be1ns 
ror Roroe, ainoe to be mean. to be individual. The principle ot 
indi vlduatlon i8 pul'pOBe. Purpose gIve. 011. hi. l"8allt,.. whIch can-
not be that ot anothett, tor it it weN the. the other would be hla-
selt, i.e.. the other would not be otber. 
)0 
The pUl'poa. of eaoh finite being 1s deternl1netd '01 the Abso-
lute. It baa been .een already thE. t the tin1 te beings are exprea-
.iona ot the Absolute. The ptlZ"poae or the Absolute 1n expressing 
himael:f 1n th1. pal't1oular way and not in another g1 ves to the fi-
nit. belns beth ita exiatellCe .. cElts 1ndiY1duallty. It the Abso-
lute in two lnatanc •• wanted to express himssl!, 1n the very same v 
'II a., , the n thAII re would be only one t1ni te being. !hus, the re all ty 
of one beins canb.&t enol'Qa ch on another t $. 
Perhapa &. ~ontl'adlotlon appears here to those who hay. not 
investigated the matter further with Royce. It the finite beings 
are jut expressions ot the Absolute, doesn't that de!l)" the verr 
posalbi+lt, of individuation tor tinite bel~? Furthermore, if 
~ ethical aelt i. in Ii. senae 1nf"inite, does that _an that he haa 
to be the same .s the Absolute? 
'fbi. 1. ROJoe t S paradigm in the form ot a table which will 
be •• t up tor what R0108 in tb& text expresses in words: 
B 
l 1 2 .'3 4 • • • 
~1 2 4 8 16 • • • 
12 .3 9 27 81 • • • 
~3 c:: 25 125 62S • • • ... 
~4 7 49 34,3 2401 • • • 
~5 11 121 • • • 
l6 1) 169 • • • 
7 
7Thili TT hl.o_C::l 
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Row A 1~· the set of' l1hole numbcro. 'rhe dota indicate the.t 
~he series S08S to Infinity. Column B i8 the set of pri~ numb~re. 
prime numbers cannot be factored into mol" basi c numbers. This set 
plso goes to infinity. Corresponding to eftch number of A I the 1o'ho~ 
~umbers~ is each prime number raised to that power 1ndicated h1 the 
"hole num~r. BecnUIB e prime numbers are basic no element In a set 
~ \fl1l be the same as un element in another sot am- !Im16vcr, all 
the eler_nts ot everT set a will appear in ~. 
The tlrst aet, A, contains all the numbers 01' the other sets, 
ret It 1a an lndiyldual set 1n its own rIgb,t. Such a eet -7 be 
compared to the Absolute. The aeoond set, al, whioh is a aub-.et 
of" the tlrat, containa DO elements which can be round 1n any 01' the 
Dther seta, a2 •••• but onl,. in the tirst one. A. So it 1s with 
Baoh of" tbe sub-sets. Each .et trom the second to the lntlnl'tb., 
-1 to &oa, 1s contained In the first, AJ but 1n no wa" partiall,. 
or totall,., is a sub-s.t contained in any of" the othl~ 8ub-aeta ot 
~he first. A. 
It 18 •• en f"ltom t he example clearly enough t.be. t none or the 
~ub-s.tlJ can be a part 01.' another sub-set. In e. ai-miler we:" eaoh 
"'tntte being 1s Indlvi.duated :troM other finite beings by. lte f'vn 
~haractar18tio tora determined by its purpose. We.ertbeles8. with 
r.e.peot to the Absolute tbe probleDl remaina. Jlow can the tinite 
petng be IndlYiduate4 .trom. tbe Abaolute' 'fhat '. the point. It 1. 
~ot. 'l'bt rini t. being 1s indIviduate. in the Absolute. The aub-
.ets each appear in the tirat, A. Each sub-a.t has an Intel11g1lfi1e r 
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of its own, end so it is individual. The first set has an intel-
ligibility of its own, w:uch i8 not the s arne as the t of the sum-
ma tion of the sub-sets, because it is a whole in itself. Also, 
there are many more possible sub-sets other than those based on the 
prirr.es. Therefore, it is seen that the first set A, is an individ-
ual and the t the others are also individuals, even while they ap-
pear in the first set. Eaoh sub-set, by the 'II ay, has an infinite 
number or elenents; yet, it only pHrtlally mirrors ft" wh1ch also 
has an infinite number of elements. T.be etlliottl self is infinite 
in that, 'because a .finite beint; is essentially ternporal, it will 
never be fully expressed. (Tha t the S(;ts appear on different lines 
IWhen they aI'8 put on paper ought not to lead one into thinking that 
the sub-sets 'exist apart from the first set.) 
For Royoe, to be is to fulril purpose. If there is an iden-
ity of God and finite beings, it is a fcrmal enG. In other 'Hords, 
it the finite enters into the being of the Absolute by helping it 
achieve Its purpose, then they have some identity. "The identity 
of the t"1n1te llnd the Absolute lllOan.ing' is. for us. now mere iden-
Iti ty wi thom differoence. !,8 
Here ia an analogy contrived by this author, Which maT help 
Ito bring out Royce's idea. Suppose each cell of the bod.1 we.s con-
~clous or ita aotivity in the integral body. Suppose each l/lember 
of the body was oonscious of its aotivity, which is beyond the col-
leoti va act! vlt;y 01.' the oells. The person, as the .• elt which 
8 Ibid., p. 369. 
-
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ntegratea the parts into Ii! harmonious whole, hRS a consciousness 
~f his activity as the composite and, 8.lso, the consciousness of 
"he pa.rts whicb he ia. 
If the above be admitted. tor the sake ot clariticati on ot 
~oyce's notion of the Absolute--tinite beings relationship, some 
problems concerning identity may be resolved.. First, it is seen 
';hst this relation ot .identity is not reciprocal. The cell, trom 
IIh. point ot view ot the whole, can be said to be the man. At the 
game ti .. , trom the point ot view of the cell itself, it can be 
aid to have ita own proper identity. However, it cannot be said 
IIha t the man is the c ell. Indeed, to say that the man is the sum-
nAtion of all hia cells and members with their :respeotive conscious-
leaa would not be enough, tor the man as an integral body ia con-
cioua ot himself as a one. The whole is more than the sum of 
)arts. Man is identical with the Absolute, for his achieving be-
ng is the expression of the Absolute, whioh is t.he Absolute it-
.elf. But the Absolute is not the man. Man, becorr.d.ng hiD18elt in 
r--ime, haa a tpanscendental relation to the infinite Absolute, who 
~tands completely exppes.e4 in eternity. 
The absolute tinds it. expres.ion in the finite expresaions 
which oan be syncategorematically Intinite); yet, it has an intel-
~igibility over and beyond a multiplicity of finite expressions. 
~t as an integral Whole is an individual. But each of these finite 
~xpre8sions has an intelligibility ot its own in the Absolute. Each 
s an individual. IndiViduation can be appreoiated only in the 
.... 
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intellectual sphere: "All truth is the object of acknowledgement, 
Rnd not Trierely of' immedia te experience. • • • • And the senses 
luever show us individuality ••••• ,,9 Nevertheless, the human 
!intellect cannot comprehend individuality. Essentially. individ-
!uality is a characteristic derived trom will. Only the Absolute 
: 1 ~ 
Icomprehends his will and, so, the individuality of' f'inite beings. 
i 
a The intelligibility which individuates the f'inite being as 
it appears iu tl.:i.G .il.bsolute is its purpose. Because that prinCiple 
f'lows trom an intelligent Will, the heart of' reality ougnt to be 
conceived as not just rational, but also volitional. Correspond-
ingly, reality is known, not by intellect alone, but b,y an enlight 
! 
iened will in an a.ct ot appreciat1ve love. The bare intellect can 
m 
come to an underatandins ot realIty's struGture. A lovIng will is 
in contact with the f'ull realIty, a structure enriched with indivi -
~ 
luality. The Absolute in choosing a specif'ic purpose for himselt 
I 
ibrings into actuality an individual. That purpose ordained by the 
! !, 
IAbsolute's will, whIch i8 the internal meaning of' the individual, 
Icomes to be known in love. 
Royce would aS80ciate universality with intellect and in-
dividuality With will. as also Marcel, Cro.e, Sturzo. and others 
! ~.eem to have done. So 1t 1s that the individual can only be appre 
i t !ciated as individual by an act of' the will, vic., love. The reali 
s 
~ ~of' the individual lies in the realm of' will. Por the intellect, 
~ , 
9Ibid., p. 159. 
-10 Ibi d ., p. 432. 
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then, realit)" wl11 alwa)"s be beyond full comprehension, will be a 
11 
mystery. But, of course, that i8 said t~om the tlnite position. 
To the Absolute, the \<iorld is comprehensible because he i8 the one 
who has ordered it. In tact, the world can be only insofar as it 
i8 ordered b7 the Absolute, who eternally gives each temporal in-
41 vidual his purpo ••• 12 Ultimtltely reality 18 rational, but its 
parts rouat be 8 .. n in the whole, &lnd only the Ab80lute CHim 00 that 
oompletely. For tinite beings, Royoe will say in hi. later philos 
ophJ, the ultimate reality e amot 'be had in .en •• -peroeption or in 
abstraot conception, but only in "inte.pretation, tl 01117 1n a aympa 
thetic appreoiation. 
The tree will ot tn. Absolute ohoo.ea to express it.elt in 
one finite expression among the lI:UII'ly possible choioe.. Thu., the 
tinite being springs into existence and i. individual. 
Yet this rtJ7 whole J'l6aning, while one with Hi. meaning, 
l'8maina, in the et.mal world, still thi. unique snd 
individual meaning, which the lite or no other indIvidual 
Selt pos •• s.... So that in MJ eternal expre •• ion I 10 •• 
not mr individuality, but rather win ~ oa17 genuine in-
diVii~1 expre.aion, even while I tind mJ onenesa with 
God. 
The human .elt i. Indi vidual, ot cour.e, becsuse it is a 
being. However, the individuating purpoae need not be satistied 
in the existing m.anJ inde.d, because man i8 eS8entially temporal, I' 
.. 
llIbid., p. 433. 
-
12Royce, ~ Spirit 2! Modern Pb1losoeer, p. 380. 
lJnoyce, The World and the Individual, II, 1$0. 
- --14 Ibld., p. 428. 
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the purpose cannot be satisfied. Man must try to .fulfil his pur-
pose which is assign€ d to him by the Absolute. How he beooaes 
aware or his purpose will be explained later. In trying to satisfy 
the Absolute's purpose he is maklng himself more an individual. 
"MON" is In the .enae that hls 11fe is unitled ancl a( controlled 
in 1.ts direction that no other can la-r hnl~ ('61' '!t ~I!I its own. 
"MeSDwnile, I camot too strongl:r Insis t that, in our present torm 
of human conaclousness, the true Selt of an:r Individual man is not 
1$ 
a datum, but an ideal. 
Here one ma:r well take except10n to Joseph Blau's interprets.-
ition of Ro:rce's notion of Ind1'flduallt;r. He seems to infer that 
",he ultlmate reality ot the self is ita disaolvement in the Abso-
lute. "Personal Independence is but-a temporar:r stage whose ultl-
~at. aim i8 the realization ot the unl'fersal will." l6 He regards 
uemporallt,r as a mere stage ot the finite selt as it progresses to-
wards its eternal fUSion in the Absolute. It has been shown 1n 
this paper that the tinlte selt t~ Ro;rce retains its individua11t;r 
while exist1ng enl:r 1n the Absolute. Etern1t;r is for the Absolute, 
as temporallt;r needs to be part ot tl» veFf make-up of an finite 
selt. It the finite aelt is eternal, then it must be eternally 
lJemporal. 
l610seph L. Blau, Men and MO'fements In Amerioan Philosophy 
New Yoek: Prentice-Hal~Inc., 1952), p.~ll. 
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B. Unique 
The human selt is unique. No other 1.s like him, nor can any 
other be like him. !bat which makes him an indiviJual also makes 
him unique. Each individual has iii. unique purpose, which m.ake s him 
individual. As individuals, finite beings are materially distinct; 
as unique entities, they are tormal17 distinct. Since in Royce's 
Ideali.tic ph110sopbJ the distinction ot matter and farm dissolves, 
to be an individual means to lit unique individual. 
And individuals are not kept asunder by CM.B", 
but are made dis tinct through. tha 1r various 
meanings, i.e. through the variet, ot the Pur-17 
poses ot wniOh their lives are the expres.ion. 
Each human selt hall a l.mlque Identl ty. "Tho he is can never 
be the who he is ot another. Logically, in Royce's system ~ach 
selt must be unique. It one selt tind. its identity in relation 
to all others, even it they be intinite in number, then one ot the 
others camot have the very same identity. It a set, be it inti-
~ite or tinite, has elements Xl, %2' x3 ' ••• , the set of Xl'S 
eomplementa17 elements (all those element.:s ot t he basic set whi eh 
are not Xl) cannot be the set ot X2 '8 complementary elements. SilD 
~l ia defined by its complementar,r elements, as %2 is by its, etc., 
~l is a unique element in the basic •• t. 
Since man i8 essentially temporal, according to Royce, eaoh 
man must be unique. Obviously. two men cannot appear at the s arne 
time and in the aame place. It this were to happen, then Royce 
17Royce, The World and the Indiyidual, II, 239. 
- - - ...... -----
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would 8ay, according to his de,f'ini tiona, that there really is onl,. 
one man. If the men appear at different times, then each has a 
different history behind him and a different future ahead of him. 
Their worlda are different; thua, the men, too, must be different. 
It the men appear at the same time in different places, they are 
different. The Bame goal, the~ self, the same identity, cannot 
be aohieved in di,f'ferent plaoes, tor there il at least a local dif 
ferentiation. Bach human aelt is unique, therefore. The complex-
i t7 of the human Belt makes his uniqueness all the more evident. 
Uniqueness gives to man a apeoial tie with the Absolute. T 
Absolute can be what .he ia, his expression c an be Buch, only beca 
each man is who he is. It a oertain man were not, t he Absolute 
would not be less, but he would pe difterant trom what he i. it 
the man does exist. An infinite series would still be infini~e if 
one of the elements were dropped, but it would not be the same 
series. 
Universal natures, then, are categories fer classification. 
Because of the similarity in the purposes of certain finite beings 
the,. can be grouped under 'bhe heading "men." Men do not have the 
same universal form; th~ have their own proper unique forma which 
approximate one another in kind. "The uniqueness ot rr11' meaning is 
,,18 
.the ane essential tact about me. 
The value ot the human person tlows, not trom some abstract 
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essence, but from the individual's unique role in the very make-up 
of reality. For Royce, everrthing as well aa everyone ia a gOOG o 
-
If it ia, t.b.en it 1s tulfilling a ur..Ique purpose; and, so, it is 
in itself a good. 
c. Identitl. 
Every man has an ident1t7 proper to hImself; yet, no nIS.n hps 
attained. his rull Identit7. Because he is a unique individual, 
every man can s a7 that he has an identity. that he is somebody, 
that he has who-ness, that ther-e is meaning for him in the terln 
"I." .. Jho is he, Now, he is the integral 8'lU1l or hip striving to 
fulfil his unlque purpope. "For the Self in ltp entlrety ls the 
whole or a self-representative orzec'I.lrrent prooess, and not the 
mere last moment or stage of that pl-oces8. tt19 Hut the present ego 
115 not his full identit7. "I am not one wlth M1 own eternal in-
dividuatlity •• ae is also the he who is in progress toward 
an ideal self, the pert.ct fulfilment of his purpose.2l 'l'herefor4l, 
both the past acts ot aelf-acquirtng and his limit point, his Id~aJ 
self, give him his identit7. His ideal self gives his atriving 
direction. In hi. subjective sphere, the ideal selt does what pur-
pose dOGS in the objective sphere. The ideal self and unique pur-
pose are two ways at looking at t he a ame thing. Both give directkl: 
19 Ibid., p. 135. 
-
20Ibid ., p. 149. 
-
2lPaul Runaell Anderson and Max Ha~old Flach, Ph110S0P~ in 
America (New York: D. Appleton-Centurr Compan7, 1939), P. 5 .--
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and make poss1bls development 1n personal 1dentitJ. 
There is, then, f'or each human being an identity peculiar to 
him. Beoause each has a unique purpose, he cannot become other 
than the ideal selt which the Absolute w111s tor him. Manis optlm 
Is to be or not to be. He cannot choose to be th1s or that. All 
moral choioes either help one on toward his goal or not. It will 
be s?en later t., han men do not have to have some sort of' super-
natural revelation t 0 lee who the,. should be or what t he,. should 
do in a partioular sltuetien. Beoause the ind! vi dual is si tuated 
in one set of oircumatanc •• , there 18 but oae oorre.pond1ng per-
teet choIce tor htm at a particular time and place. other ohoices 
1n that situation mwt be le •• good than the one whioh would put 
the ind1vidual in pertect harmoD7 with his communit7. There are 
man7 possible ohoices because the person i8 free to act to the ex-
tent t hat he w1ahe.. The possible choice. 'farry quant1tat1volr, 
then, and not qualitativel,.. In short, tar an ind1vidual in a 
g1ven circumstance there is ane ideal ohoioe and man7 01' loss 
worth 1b ich, nevertheless, oan be termed good because the,- do ap-
proach the ideal. Bad choices are tboae which appear on the con-
tinuum 01' pOBsi ble choices as rather distant from the ideal. An 
abaolutel7 bad choice i8 inconceivable, for no one oan so gp 
agaInst him.elf aa to will evil per se fo~ himself'. 
Man. 18 g1 'fen his ldenti t7 as potenti a1 in the a ens e that he 
has in himself a character which i8 unlike al170118 el •• 's. That 
character 1s ultimately ~at makes him to be who he is. It is not 
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a fluid, .. plr1cal determlnation, which can be only 8uperrlclal to 
the true Identlt,' of the purpose. That ch.a.racter, which is de-
termin&d by the indlvldual's unique purpoae, is his core. "In God 
you posseas your Individualit7. Your veI7 dependence is the con-
dition ot your freedom, and of' yom' unlque signitlcance.Il22 
Man is not given his identity a. a.ctual. He Jnuat acquire hil 
who-ness by exercising his free wlll. Man becomfl:S who he is by de 
liberatel,. choosing to be rather than not to be. He BlUst choose tc 
be real, to pla, his role in reality, to fulfil hi. unique purpose 
or to be pe tt7, to ceue to function as an integral part of realitlJ 
to deny his purpose as his. 
But.. too, you will know that you are a 8elf precisely 
in so far aa you Intend to aeeomplish God fa w1ll by 
becoming one, and that you are an individual preclsely 
in so fu as y,u purpose to do TOur Father's buslness 
in un1que fashion, so that In this !natant shall begin 
a work that can be finished only in eternlt7,--a work 
that, however cleaelT bound up it may be wlth all the 
rest .of the dlvlne lite, still remains In2its expression distinguishable f'rom all this other 11fe. :3 
The human self tor ROToe ls essentiallT moral. In fact only 
b.1 tunotioning as a moral agent does theaelt acquire actualit7. 
The selt can d.velop an17 1n the 11ght ot to. Ideal self, on17 whe~ 
the shallav.ness ot the empirloal selt is seen a8 lnadequate.24 How 
22Ro7ce, Th. World and the Indlvidual, II, 417. _ • ____ ...-..-. .;;:;.;;;;;;;,;;;;,0;.;;;;..; ___ _ 
231bld., p. 277. 
-~o.e. Judah Aronson, La Ph11oaopbie Morale De Josiah Royce 
(Parl., Libralrl. P'llx Alcai; 19210, p. 121. --
the self' OOlUsa to an awareness of' its ideal will be taken up in a 
later chapter. 
Han is •• It-identical, then, 1n that he 1s a unique individ-
ual. Man 1s aelt ... ldentit7ing in tb.at he mua t acquire for himself 
his awn reallty. 
D. Person 
Man is a person because he is aelf-conscious in that he is 
aware of' himself as the directlon of his aot!v! tie •• 25 tihen ha 
has evaluated the possible cour ••• ot action in tbe light of' his 
purpoae, he, then, can wl1l bis choice into act. 
POI' Royce, man i. not a mere tunctionarr, for each hUDlUl selt 
is conscious ot Itself as a good 1a ltselt. True, the actual ac-
quiring ot 1denti t7 wl11 demand tbat t he sell' function a8 an inte-
gral member ot the whols, which i. maniteat in one way by soclett'o 
.evertheless, the functioning is not conoelved of as a good in it-
selt, but rather the indiVidual, alone, is a good in himself. So, 
alao, the Absolute as an individual, not as a collective system, 
is a good In h1Juelt. The t"unotloning of the Indlviduals, then, 
ls necessary but a .econdary value, trom the point of v1ew of man. 
The universe 1s not a vast mach1ne, some of whose parts happen to 
be tree. The universe has in its compOSition persona, subsistent 
values. Indeed, all the individuals in the un! vel's. are in 80me 
lWay consclous, and 110 are persons. "The unoonscious we re ject, 
2Saoyce, 'Ihe World and the Individual, n, 425. 
- --
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becaUie our Pourth conception of Being forblds all ~ecognitlon of 
unconscious realltlea.n26 Man ia diatinctive aa a class of beings 
because the specific purpose. ot each meMber are approximately slm-
ilar. Since man 1. the be.t known ot all tne cla8.ea, Royce con-
centrate. his phl10sopny on human belngs and admits h18 ignorance 
ot t he other cl aaae •• 
It waa pointed out earlier that R07ce .ees no contradlction 
in retaining indivlduality tor that which Is a part of another in-
dividual. So, then, men remain persons although the,. are onl,. the 
expressions or the Absolute Person. 
People comDlanl,. tend to forlllUlate their flrst concept of the 
individual or self on an unreflectlve level where identit,. is in 
terma ot the empirical, but the,. cannot rest 1n this naive pos1tiCII. 
The,. usually choose one ot three further explana tiona, two ot wh1cb 
are realistic, corresponding to the first concepticm of 'being, and 
the third. idealistio, correspondlng to the fourth conception ot 
being. The first w &J' 18 directl,. empirical. It holds that the 
tull explanation ot a manta selt i8 on the empirical le.el, which 
is given iDm1edlate17 in experience, and that there ls no other 
le.el.27 This path fails to gl.e an account ot how it is that 
so_thing ot the 1ndl vidual aelt is permanent amid the flux of the 
emplrioal world. 28 In other warda, it taila to give a full 
26 ROJce, 
27Ibld. , 
28;bid., 
~ World !!!! ~ ... In ...d_i_v_i_d_u_a_l, II, 241. 
p. 2S7. 
p. 260. 
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explanation of the aelf. 
The aecond possible path. whioh leads beyond the initial 
unretlecti ve conception of the selt, is the metaphysical. The se11 
1s here detined in terms of independence. The majorit7 of philos-
ophers 1n the past have taken this route. Royce cannot tollow 
Realism here. The sell' 1s not s. thIng. a compartmentalized entIt,-
29 
e.g., a SUbstance. B070e strongly- reruees to put t he ultimate 
real1't7 ot the Indl"ldual In some airy entity or pr1noiple, \'lhich 
oan only be alluded to but i8 ot lIttle I mport to t he existing ot 
the indi"idual. He Njects the notl.on of substanoe as being such 
8. prinoiple. Also, t he idea of' Monads goes contra17 to Royoe's, 
because it tails to "lew the indIvidual as one eonstltutlonal17 
related to other.30 The material chasms, which tor that sort ot 
realist derine individuality, separate indl"iduals 80 that commun-
tty .. Which :t .• an actual tact, 18 impossible. 
With t he passIng at the realistie explane,tt, on of the sell', 
~oyce's own aOmElS torward: "A Mean:t.:ng embodied in a consciOus 
~1te.d3l This third path 1. the atrictly Idealistic one. The 
reaU ty ot the selt lies in 1 ts internal meaning, as fultl111ng 
29Ibld., p. 268. 
-
.3°Ibid ., p. 238. 
-
31Ibid • 
-
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'rhe fil'8t conception or beInt:. HtH~,U.8»t, beoflu •• of ita In-
herent 1nabl11 tJ tel give ft satl.ta,et()!'1 definItIon ot the person, 
has le4 HOlO. 'to formulate hll! own. Tt. .eoond ~m(l third concep-
tIon 01" be1ng, M¥8tlclam, d~ a net rind ~ch ot a pl"ObleJl In de-
1"1D1ng th{; Individual ."ltt. POI' Hyattc! am., the IncUv1dual 1a an 
1llusion, a drea.m.32 .. thud conceptIon ot belng, CrItical !'ta-
tlO1laUam, th.1nks that it ean tul17 explain the indIvidual self In 
tere or Yalldltr w1.th Napeot to a. .,..tem. The a.l1" is an auton-
aHoua ayatem ot valId! t7. 
The deteot at Cr1tleal Ratlo11ll11am l1ea In the 
oon •• queno.. of 1 ta .... ntlal17 abat;l"aot and 
impersonal v1e" of BelDa. The Selt, In tilts 
•• n •• , 1. a l .. w 1'&the~ tban a 111". J and", type 
ot .y~atenc8 ratDt$r than an IndIvIdual. 
ROIO. wlanes to retam all tb.e oharacter1.tlcs ot a r-ree, 
Bo01al, self-developing .. tt, While he aeee thB 8elt'. reallt7 1n 
a ooncrete .,.ten, tna Absolute. 
;~nd a1nce the Self Is prec1sely, tn ita whol .... , the 
oone.lou. and loten'lonal hl:f'l1ment ot this d1 vtr. pur-
pose, in 1 ts own unl'lu val', the 1ndi v1dual vll1 or the 
Self 18 not wholly 4et.nd..ne4 bJ .. poVN' that taah10na 
It a. cla, 111 t •• Moneel and that '.$ call.4 ("rOd's Wl11J 
but, OIl the contra..." what the Sol.t 11l Ita wholene •• willa 
le, just 1n 80 tar, Ooc!tfl 11111, and Is IdentIcal w1th 
one of tb.e -aRT ex,pro •• lona ll1PUed b, a alasle dt vlne 
purpc ae, eo that, tOr! the re •• ona already .et forth., In 
SGn.ru, In tbe 010a1,. leoture or the toregolna •• 1'1 •• , 
thct ~.lt 1s 1n ita lnnermoat lndf.vlc:lt.lallty, not an 1n-
44tpend4tn', but .'111 a Pree Will, til io11. in 110 tar! own. 
no external Mastar, de.pite 1ta un1tJ with t he whole ltr. 
ot Oed, and d •• pite 1ta dependenoe 1n coun,le.. WAT. upon 
12I bId., p. 284 • 
• 
33Ib1d ., p. 28b. 
-
Nature anc1 upon 1 ta tel lows, tor .9.r1th1na e.¥Qept 
the Indlv'"duallty ~.nd unlqu.nesl ot ita 11! •• -''+ 
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rille .h.l.&man selt Is an individual person having a unique ld.n-
tlt7. Man 1s an expreualon of the Abaolute, ,..t, mants reality 1. 
p'eol •• 1, beitlti the DU1i\l'1 that n. 18. )I-·n in being in the ADsolute 
i'etuna AM tlnda b.1maelt. )low that an anaW8t- haa been t'orm.ulated 
trie questilon UIiQ' be aakod in wonder 1II1th R07ce: "What Qeepezt hu-
l:nan rqatel'J ia the" than th4t Ego?")S 
-----------------34Ib14., pp. 286-81. 
F 
3Stb1d •• p. 21. 
-
THE flliALITY or 'I'HE: HUMAl( SELF 
The p\U'po •• of thi. ohapter 1. to indicate the .elt'. place 
in 1t8 world. 'the lfottld and the 1ndl"ldual are oorrelatlve terN 
top 80708, The wo~ld 18 a eonatltutlve ot tbe •• It, and the eelt 
18 an •••• ntial In the _ke-up ot the aotual world. Row, ROTce'. 
~.taph7al0. of the ~r.on ... t be .. en In IIlOf"e cemeNte dimenaiona. 
It haa been all_a that according to the Fourth Conoeptlon or 
~ln& an enti'1 haa -lDa cmlT all • tult1b1ent of purpos.. The In-
Itegl'&tlon cf tl» tinlte embodiment. or PW'Poae fOl'l'ia the expresalO11 
~t the Absolute, who willa tbe f1nlte inatance. into bel~ by ehoo .. 
lng to hay. certain purpotuta tuln1l .... 1 Aoccrd1ng to thet meta-
ph7s1e_, then, tlw hUtllflll person 18 essentIally soot.1. The more a 
.lan _fIlth •• lses hima elf w1 th the bwnan CODJrluni tJ, the :ariON a perflOn 
tle becomes. Dl thue un! tins h1ma81t w1 til ttl 8 exps-.. slon of t h. 
lb801ute, the per.on unlteshimselt to the Absolute, hi. will be-
a ~o.e. ea. with tba Absolute's. 
Roree aa78 that the selt haa 1dentitT In 80 tar as it can be 
relat •• to the apparent polar •• ructtre ot Nall'7. The .elt 18, 
lRc7ce. The World and the ID41v1dual, II, 4S2. 
__ -.-._ r 
'Ibid., p. 13S. 
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on the nne hand, identIfied 1n ita relation to the Absolute; and, 
on the other hAnd, it Is identified 1n ita relation to the world, 
which 18 othep finite selv&.. "Con •• quentl,., eYtin what ie most 
lnd.! .,ldual about t he Self' n."81' appefll'S exeept In thft closest con-
nection With What transcends both the meaning and the l'.fe or the 
tln1te indlVidual. ttl Ro,"ce does not yj.ew the •• poles aa d18june'" 
ttv., but rathep a8 identical, In a a.n.8 pecul1ar to Royea. The 
Absolute tinds its ex.pNs.lon, and so tta NAllt7. 1n tlnlt$ selv .. 
The hU1lAn person 1a Buch an expres.ion. 
Ord1naJ'lly. 1 t 1. C(lmwnl,7 agreed, God (or t he Absolute) 
d<.B a not 411'.ot17 tall man what he vould 11ke hi. to do and, 80, 
ito beoome. ROTe_, too, telt t b,sI.t cli.ine reYelatlona were n¢ the 
~atur.l meana ftl' making tlw ehoicea of dally lite. Slnee m.an 1a 
en expt-eaalon \d .. thin an expression, he !lUst be in harmonY' with the 
lether taotcra In the expN .. 1on. '1'0 8fte hi. !'Ole In the expression 
~t the Abaolute, MAn need only to app~clat. the world around him. 
~he world and the indiyIdual ape c01Telatlves. not lsolated trOnt 
one another as 80ml naiYe reaUatlc philosoph1 •• would hJJ.1,te theM. 
Man 1lU8t fit into the aoclal etructu:re, "'h.Ich 1s hi. W'ol"ld, 
It he i8 to acquire hi. Identity_ S~eI.t1, tor 10TC., 1s not It.-
~te. to h.uman •• lves. The whole un1vttrse 1s a society, that is to 
say, aoelall1 relat~ul .81" •• wbloh are Indiv1dual :tactors In the 
totel expression or the Absolute It The •• It in the animal klng40a 
.3Ibld., p. 169. 
-
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p0881bl1' _., be a whole genWl, rather t han a pl!:l.rtlculs.r inferior; 
1'1owe.,e., ROlce 1.&"8. euch speculation for lack of ev1.aeu<..;&. 
The prlma1'7 society fOJ.'l man, o'bYloual1 enough, 1s t b.6 human 
80cle,,_ To aoquiN hi. lndivld.ual goal and Identity. each man 
muat find his place wI tll hi. feUow men. IJ1 the naturally harmon-
loua expre.sion ot .001e',. men can help one another find theIr 
penonal rultllme nt. as the, compo.t te17 uhle". the purpo.. of b 
Absolute, who haa w11led tbat humanIt,. be part or bi. expNaalon. 
part ot hi. Identltr. 
R07ce, tbAJn, •••• _n not a. 1D.4ependent .ntlt18. lil1ch can 
.tand 41YI4e4. He •• e. them as ontloally bound inatanoes ot the 
bsolute. who need one anott». 1n ord.,. to haYe 1;helr own beina. 
The brotherhood ot man I. no po.tlotlg\1r. t ... ROJce. It 1. the 
.a.eno. of _okSad. That tllt ¥erld chao. ot' earl, twentIeth cen-
tU17 hu-.nlt7 was tatal to ROJo. 1s not 8urpl'181ng. 
The .oli.arU~7 ot _n Is such that the tailings or one are 
telt b7 all. In fact, the abort-com1ngs 01' one .. abel" 1n tbe 
achieylng the expre •• ion ot the Absolut. ~t be compensated tor 
by another. 
In the human aoole'1, all"."d1 atruoturea bJ' h1ato.t'J, 1n wh1c 
the •• It 18 p1aoe.. tn. •• It IIm8t .eUtah out hi. ro1. and then p 
it. Thus, be acquire •• elth.oo4, ldentt'7. 
Sineo hi. 14ent1t,- f .• an express!.' ot the Abaolute, the hu-
man •• It' l* lea •• baa the eternal 8iani.tioanoe ot t te Absolute. 
That man is •••• nti.ll,- temporal in no wa,. d1sparage. hia value 
.s a person. tor ho haa an intricate part l,n tllf" eXf,reeeion or the 
bobsolute. 
The communi t7 to which the .elf is related i8 not Just the 
!nov ex1sting one. The selt 1s in :relation tot he statie cOl\'lmUIllt7 
ot now~ true. But, also, it 18 1n relation to the coaaunlty ot tk» 
paat uut that ot the future. All thoa. finite expn.slona ot the 
~bsolut. mien preceded the selt' have oontributed to the identlt7 
of that Belt. All tho •• expres.lon. to come are 1n SORe way de-
pended on this 8611 "ror their Identity. 
R07ce b7 no £leana intended that hi. ph110sopb7 should stand 
aloot fl90a the world ot _n. There would be no purpose tor an 
"ivory-tower" phllo80pbJ In R07C.'. syst... Without a purpose a 
tbing oannot be real. In his later philosoPh7. R07ce spent much 
of bis ettorts 1n 6xpl1clt17 applf1ns tde metap}q81oa to t he world 
about h1m. ae did thR.t to such an extent tbat M8n7 interpreters 
ba.e t'ailed to apprec1 ate hi. under17lq _tapn,alc8. "What 0011-
cerns anr'man more tban his place 1n the world. and the Reaning ot 
the world in wblch he 1s to tind tM. Plac.,,,4 
}I{aft first ouaes to an awaNne.s ot his lnneJ' _anina through 
the OOlll'.l!Wl1 tJ' 1n whlch be nnds hi_elt. "Iobod,- amongat WI men 
comes to se1t-oonso1ousness t 80 tar aa I 1m_. except under the 
perslaten' 1nfluence ot' his 800181 tellows."> When he hns found a 
propol' plaoe tor hi.elf in hi. ooJUlUl1 t7, the man bas oome to his 
4Ibid., p. 1. 
-
'Ibid., p. 261. 
-
Sl 
rat appreciation or b1aaelf' .a a reel •• 11'. Now that rut 1. 
wakened to the realIty of hi. being a unique parson, tbs D~ be-
Ina to aoquire turth8tt identIty. He a ••• hi_elf as a vulue 1n 
maelf, although hi. tunetloninr, wl11 alway. be 1n the oontext 01' 
eomnun!t7. Bo strives to achieve him ~oal of totnl identIty. 
total perfection. ~t trl.. point, he hAa come to a direct ap-
reeiation of' the .Abaolute'8 will. When the man will. his Identlt 
e haa confottWtd his wl11 to the Absolute's. That the wl11 of the 
baolute 18 compatIble with man ought not to atartle one. It 1. 
oat natural. When man tztUl,. wl11a, hi. vl11 i8 the Absolute'. 
In him. I\..s the mt.D aohiev •• hi. ideal goal of perfect 
$0 too ln that act does ttle Absolute achie •• ita .elf'ho 
-01' course, tram the paint 01' view ot the Absolute-a et.ttnity, be 
• his full identit, already expre ••• 4.6 
The man, bJ' tNly 11.ing In b.1m ",ovld, haa brld>,~.d t he gap 
n eommunicntlon betveen t he Absolute and h1r.welt. Pi:rat be tI'lUst 
ppNclate the world, then hllUtelt, and 80 the Absolute. Man oome 
o an appreciation nt God's (the Absolute's) wl11 not through di-
vine illum1nntion or any etfo%·ts 1n prayer. He co_s to it b,- I1v 
ing as himself, his t~ue aelf. ~hat he Can r.eo[~1ze hl~elt 1s 
Sl1"t or manta conscious nature. 
!he ideal selt of e"e1"';1 person I. pl"eaete1"mned b7 the A.beo-
ute. A8 a person particIpate. in the world, whioh 18 t be expre8-
10n ot't he Absolute' a wtll, he f'l.tl.t'11s h.i8 1deal. The Ideal can 
6 Ibld." p. 148. 
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p.ever be totally fulfilled, tor if that were ;0 happen tJ.i.on the 
~ontinued exlstenee ot the person would be without purpose. With-
~ut purpoa e a belng cannot exlst. 
rhe task ot the philosopher i8 to bring t 0 11&1t that there 
~8 more to reallt7 than tne "world ot description." He must tell 
pi8 tellow .. n the good neW8 that thelr 8eemingl,. lruslgn1ticant, 
..... 748.7 lite 18 of equal 81gn1tieanC6 as the gigantic cosmos, tta.t 
in ht.aelt man bas a personal dIgn1t7 whIch he eternally gaios tor 
n1 ... 1t. "The w8.J ot retlectlon 18 long. The torest ot our com-
mon hWIlHn ignorance is dark and tangled. • • • • The philosopher, 
in the world ot thought, 18 by 4.st1111' tore vel" a trontiersman. n7 
fhe phiJ,osopher t s 1'01. In the world 18 to lead men trom their prim-
1t1ve attitude of seltish 1nd.pendence to the aoclal awarenea. ot 
their eternal significance. Ob.loua17, then, the phil080pher can-
not be content to bull. an ab8traot S78te., wblcb. can hard17 en-
lighten the exoteric world. The philosopher muat apply hi8 meta-
phy8ios to t he needs ot his da7. Therea he will tind the teat tor 
nis philoaop):q'. In The World and the Individual, II, R07ce !.a con .. 
~.t _~ ............. t .... • 
eamed. with de.,eloping the metaphy'8ic. which he will applr in hi. 
Ilater phl108opl'Q" to the conc"te. An example of that would be hi. 
IProgPllm tor international lruauranee. S. propo.ad It a s a p088ible 
~a'1 to 4et.,.. war and to _n4 transgressions in a manner tl tted to 
~---------------,--
7Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
-
5.3 
rational men.8 
The rather cold, abstraot, metaphys1cal term '~Absolu.te" is 
translated in the religious sphtu'8 by the term God. 9 When one. 
-
metaphysically speaking, strives to acquire his ident1ty by ~ul­
t1ll1ng the Absolutets purpose. he ia trying to do Ood's will. 
The harmony of the lnd1 v1dual wi th t he whole Is virtue. The apprech· 
at10n of the internal meaning ot another is love. The solidar1ty 
ot t he ind! vidual. in one is the bond ot ohal'lty. The total iden-
titJ 01' the person In the Absolute 8.ppears in the relig10us sphel'e 
1n the torm 01' the total depen4ence ot the creature. The ereature 
1s helpless without the sustain1ng fUnotion1ng ot God. The crea~ 
needs God both tor hia continued existenoe and tOI' allot ,his acts. 
Without God the creature can have no ident1t7, to!' he could not be t 
~he tru. imit7 01' the b.wrtaD. cOJIIIRwi tT 11es 1n t he World of 
lppreclation. Only by becoming aware ot the 1nternal meanIngs 01' 
~nd1 viduals cen a person beoome alrare ot his own internal meaning. 
pnly then can he unite h1mselt in anT meanIngful va,. to t he COM-
munity. By s. doing. he becomes M:mael1'. The community is a con-
stitutive 01' the individual, juat .. a the individuals form t he eom-
Inunit,-. 
A man oan best come to an appreciation cf himself in a 
8Ralph D1 Pasquale, O.F.M., The Sooial DimenSions of the 
Pbilo •• phJ' ot Josiah ~olhZ (Rome: '"1'in£!t1e!um Atnenaeuui"Antcmia!Ull 
"aculta. phII'oaoehIea, l' a •• ~ Lau.rean-l 41, 1961), p. 200. 
9Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 11. 
- --
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relatIonship with another man. Through social contact man pro-
gre.aively.appreciates internal meanings, reality. In his prim1-
ti ve atage man t ends to have the naive attitude that tacta are all 
~here is to truth. Only upon becoming retlective does a man out-
/ grow that naivete. 
Faots are the invariants ~ich appear in natural phenomena. 
J1hey are t he links by Which men are able to communicate. "Por· 
only by means ot their common relations to the natural phenomena 
are the men able to give, one to another, detinite signals as to 
what their intentions are, or to detine extensive plans ot action 
~n social17 intelligible terma. nll Savages viewed tacts as em-
podied spirits. Their animiatic th8o~ preserved the notion ot 
Boc1al relation between the aubject and t he tactual object. Civ-
~lized man bas alienated tacts by categorizing them. Hia impatiema 
~o master tacta has rendered them devoid ot .. ~sonal signiticance. 
I1he need ter communication baa atandardized the categories tor men. 
rhe attitude, Which aoon tollows, ia that the whole ot reality ia 
ntelligible through categorie.. A man needa only greater preci-
~ion in cla.sifTing to cOJllprehend a tact. 
Error in the catesorizing ot tacta becomea evIdent when the 
~ategorie. cannot be applied to the social aituatIon.12 The 
lOIbId., p. 170. 
-
llIbld., pp. 183-84. 
-
12Ibid., p. 185. 
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"Human Experience" is the reservoir for ractual truth. The ulti-
mate cr1terion, then, is not any sense-experience, but rather the 
social "ought. 1t It a faot ought to rit the human experience, then 
it is a true faot. The civilized social consciousness is the apt 
judge tor tactual knowledge, rather than an individual's arbitrary 
view. An example of this would be round in the co_unity of a par 
ticular soience. The men ot that scienee 8ubmt t, through t he media 
ot periodicals I leotur~.8, seminars, their opinion to the alread.,-
existing body ot knowledge. 
Because natural phenomena appear as stable and prediotable, 
~n think that the)" know ltlat matter 1s. They would explain the 
unusual, mind, in terlll8 01'" the usual, matter. They regard matter 
as a liteless, stable meohanism controlled by rigid laws of be-
navior. Royoe proposes: "Suppose, after all, the. t this stable 
appearanoe were a delusion."l.3 
In Josiah Royce'. philosopbJ, as in a~ idealism, the ques-
tion of matter muat be handled. Ultimately, Royce w111 say that 
material things are 01'" the lame sturf that ndnd 1s. Hegel, too, 
ihints at that: "the other is mere17 the expression of the tnner.,;Lli 
ROTce maintains that the empirical sciences deal with pbtnom-
~na only- TheT never attain the thing-in-itself, although their 
~recls1on and aoeuraOT In categorizIng may lead U8 to think that 
IJIbid., p. 213. 
-14 G. w. P. aegel, The Phenomenology or Mind, trans. J. B. 
Bal11ie (2d .d., Hew YorK: MacmIllan dompiiiy~61), p. 301. 
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they ai'S rea.chlng the ultima. tft real! ty of things. Sciences J tor 
Royce, are~1ethod8 of bookkeeping. J'LlSt as t he work of an ac-
countant gives a clear pioutre ot some aspeots o~ business, so too 
do the sciences indIcate the world. But the arbitrary system. of 
the aocountant ce1.'talnly does not map on ontological realit1; like-
wise, neither do the scientifio s1stems. 
Th. sciences hay. eatrange4 matter trom mind. on a close 
inspection of matter it is seen that it is similar to mind in four 
respecta. (1) In matter, 8.S in mind .. ttl.re are irl"eYeralble pro-
cesses. (2) In the elements or matter, as among minds .. there is 
inter-communication. (3) MattAr, as woll as mind, forms its be-
havior in patterbs or habits, which eventual17 give way to new 
patter.aa. (4) The process.s of both matter and mind are evolu-
tionary. 
From the above empll"loal findings 107ce reoeive. three im-
pres.iona. (1) The contrast between mind and mat; ter. has been 
greatly exagger&tted. (2) It 1s illegitimate to I a.,. that t here is 
~con8oious nature; at moat_ it may be 8aid tha.t some beings are 
incommunicative. () Perhaps the so-oalled material beings are 
~otual11 consoious beings who are related in time on a larger scope 
than human beings (e.g._ our million 1ears may be a second for 
them) • 
In an1 case. accordtna to the FOUl"tb Conception of Be Ina an 
unoonacious datwa--i •••• a at.rial be1ng--cannot be. "The Un-
conscious we reJeot, because our l1'ourth Conception of Belng forbids 
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8.11 recognition of unconscious realities. ttl" Echoes of Teilhardta 
rtDt10n of radial energy come to mind: 
In the world, nothin, could ever burst forth as 
?rnar-aoross tfii aIr erent tnreanolds auccessri.ll 
traversed & iiOlutlon (howey.r crItIoa! that Se) 
;nlch his not atreadf--exIs£ea In an oSscure an~ 
pr!mornil fhl • tl'he organi'eniCr not exlai'ia' on 
eartli trom a first moment at Whish it was possible, 
it would never have begun later." 
Royce admite that there are real entitles apart from the 
~mowlng subjeot. W.Mt gives objects their indiylduallty is not 
natter, but purpose. Unlike the idealism ot Berkeley, ROlce main-
talna that na tUl'e is just as real, and real 1n t he same way, a.s 
nen are real. "Nature for us Is real In precisely the sanse In 
:rhloh our f'l!llow-r'!Bn are real. "17 The Absolute, then, does not 
~:reate com:m.on ll1usions In men'. minds so that t hey can communl-
~ate among themselvee. The 111ua1ons here in'Volved come 1"rom men's 
ninds the_elye.. Hen 1"001 the.elve. into thinking that t he World 
p1" Deaor'-ptlon i8 the whole or reality. Men bY' categol"1z1ng ob-
~eet. into tacts 'Void objects of internal meaning. 
Oby1ousl1, then. it a man grows intofar .a ~ becomes a mem-
~er of hls commtm1 t,.. he cannot 11 VEl sole~ In the World of De8cr!p-
loa. Indeed, 8ciences tend to estrMge h1n from his communi ty 
lnd, 80. from himself. Only by coming to an appreciation or the 
l>Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 241. 
_ T ____ .:.;;;;;;; ................... ;,;;,;0.;;. 
l6plerre Teilhard De Chal"dln, !l1le Phenomenon of Man (New 
Harper and Brothers, 19$9), p:-T.l. - -
l7Ro1ce, The World and the Individual, II, 236. 
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internal meaninGs ot others and of himself. dCJe& a man Join his 
cor<Jmm1ty. By r-efleotlve InterpretHt10n he laborlous17 approache8 
an awarene88 of %"eal!t,. Perhaps, at t hili po1nt, Royce is not too 
1B tar distant trOln Aqu:inas f contemple.tion. 
It can now be 8een that inter-personal relations had an ~b­
solutel,. necessa!7 place in Rcree'lI phllollop!l7. MNl hPs mutual 
communication only wi, th otber men. In interpretation, that pre-
cesa bY' ttb.leh truth 1s t'ound as the intf!rpretere cut oft one an-
other's 8ubjeotlYe biaaee. men come to the World ot Apprecintlon. 
Therein, they find their own fulfIlment. 
Tau. an interpretation 18 a relation which no~ 
only Involve. three te~. but brinsa them into a de-
te:rm1nate order. One of the th.ree tel"Nl is the inter-
prete., a .econd tera i8 the object--the peNon or 
the meaning or t he taxt--vh1ch 1s interpreted; th.. 
tb1~ lal tbe peraon to whom the interpretation 18 ad-dreaa.d. 9 
Interpretation .eeka an object which ia eaaen-
tlalll .p1rltual. The &b,Jaa ot ab8trao~ conoeption 
8ays ot this object, rt 1. not in me. The heaven 
ot gl1ttering 1 ... 01&cles Which perception turnlsh •• 
anewel'a the queet by aaring: It 1s not 1n me. In-
tel'pNtatlon aa181 It 1a nip tbee--e.en in thine 
lSsaat Thoa. • .lfla!nfle, 5U11!'ta Contra Gentiles, e d. Anton O. 
Pesta (Baalo Wrltm,. of Saint !noma., tf. Rew!ol'i: Random Howse, 
1945), Hi. III, ohap. !lXv!!, pp. 59-60. 
Salnt IJ,'homaa Aquinas, On the Tl'Ut11 ot the Catholic l"lth, 
Summa 0.on.~ra aenti,les
"
tra.ns7""'ltlll'l(,!'. F. AnderiO'n rd~aen-cI~:r, Yev 
IX 0 .. .1" fm-gO- looka, t95b), Bk. II, chap. 8.3, art. 28, pp. 280-81. 
Saint Thomas Aqulnaa, SU'CIIU- Th.eolo:,iicae, fld. De Hube1s, Rl1-
lUaJ't, P. Paucne .. , o.P. (oum i.itu ex reoenaIone Leonina, rr&urln1, 
ItalYI Mal'lettl, 1948), !!!!.lli fI:;;. q. 1B6, ~irt. " PP. 838-.39. 
19Jo81ah Ro,ree, The ~obleft o~ Cbr1atianltz. Vol. II, L~e­
turea XI: and XII, ClaaiYi X;;rlcan~loao,Kel'.' ad. Max H. Fisoh 
lIev York: Appleton-cent\U7-drorl'lI, Ino •• 4JSI). p. 218. 
hNI.M;} but shows us, through manl.restlng the verr 
nature ot the object to be sought, what geneNl oon-
dIt10na must be met it anJ one 1s to Interpret a 
genuine lip to an undeztatand.1ng mind. And Withal, 
interpretat10n seekS .. c1tr out or 81gbt, the home-
land where, perean.oe, we leam to under. tand one 
another ..... 
The p~lme example of an inter-personal relation • .b1p i. that 
pi the hu.sband-vife. In marriage, R01ce .8.18, the partners muat 
~ol'lle to a t!'\llt appreciation of .ach other' 8 intel'l'lal meanlns_ 
Phen, the,. so unite the ... lv •• that PUI'pos •• become one purpose 
"n the Absolu.te. their Identitle., t Mn, are conetltuted by the 
:tarltal relatlODship. 'rills Is theIr love, tot Ind the.elve. In 
:me another. For one partner to will good to himselt, to will 
aore Identit,. tor himself by striving to achieve hi. purpose, hI • 
.. deal .elt, n8ce •• al'117 d..and. tba t be wIll gOod and moM Iden-
~itJ to hI8 partner. The fultilment ot hie pwtpose I. the t\11-
P,1111ng ot her purpose. A concrete representation ot the marl tal 
Ioelatlonahip fI2IIlJ' be s.en 111 Slgrld tfrld.et's 1tPl.tl.11 ;;;;~_v..;.,ra ......... na .......... cl .... a.... t ... t ... e .... r, 
~ whIch. the wite Kl'latln de.elops 111 her IdentltJ .. a abe tlt8 her 
"it.'. purpose With her huaband'. and children's. 
Aa man by appreCiation extend. h1mael.t turtber ts-om juat 
l11_elt to the whole ot %"$&11 tr, he .e •• that his personal good 1. 
~he good ot the whole _ III no wa, 0&Jl the two good. be contradle-
~orJ. 
20Ibld., pp. 221-22. 
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ponstituted by the diarchial principles Wilieh are self and world. 21 
~n the sense that the self is determined by the free will of the 
~bsolute, the self is a totally transcendental principle. But, 
secondaril)", in t he sense that t he self finds expression onl,. in 
the world, it is a totally immanent principle. Because of its 
transcendental character, the person oannot be defined. Bowever, 
as the self becomes 1Duaanent to t he world, an .appreciation of its 
inner- uaning can be grasped. 
Ifhe principles ot t he person function in two planes of real-
~ trt the World ot Appreciation and t he World of Description. The 
~orld of Appreoiation has two aspects, willing and its consequent 
!fulfilment. The partioular act of t he will gives the persons only 
~ partial consciousness ot the .elt as it appears at the instant. 
~he total will place. the person in the eternal scheme as a selt 
fultilling a purpose. 
The d.e.d, or t he tulfilment of will, 0 an be carried out onl,. 
in the co_unit,.. In the coamnity of nature, the deed must tit 
the internsl meanings of beings. In the human communi ty, the deed 
must join the person in a greater participation with his fellow 
!men, who harmonioua17 express their wllls b7 d .eda and, so, embody 
the Absolute's Will. 
The World of Description haa two levels. The scientific 
2~o a great extent the philosophJ' ot Luigi Sturzo parallels 
R07C. 's on this doc trine of t he human person. 
Luigi Sturzo, The True Lite, trans. Barbara Barclay Carter 
"(London: Geoffrey sl.s,"""!lii' ~elUU7 Press, 1947), p. 152. 
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level MUst be appreciated t~ what it Is, i.e.# a bookkeeping 
S1ste.. f{en must not entrust all truth to the sclences. 1'he 
sclences lack any awareness ot internal meanings. Theix- fol'mS are 
detex-m1ne4 b1 the Interest ot the scientiats, not by anr lsomorp 
with reallt7. ~h. sciencea see man as a determined machine 1n It 
leaus.-ettect trameworkJ and, ot cour •• , the .01ence ••• e only in-
dependent men apart trom the human oommunit7. 
The oODlJ.'llOn-s.nae level 18 nalve. It branches out into dog-
matic metaphl'slos wlth its .tres. on it. -truth ot independent em-
pirIcal tacts and Into m,stlclsm, whlch cannot be substantIated. 
The human person la oonstituted b.J Its Ide.l .elt and the 
And, so, ROToe baa entitled his great t18taphysical work 
Wox-¥ !..!!.S t2!. .;,I_nd.-i ... v;.,;;l .... d_\la ....... l. 
CHAPTER IV 
SOME PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAI SELF 
Bow that the basic structure ot the human person has been 
seen, this chapter will look at some ot the person's properties, 
twhich make it possible tor him to tunction. The three properties 
unum, verrum. bonum (one, true, good) will be taken aa a hand,. 
lohtn. tor bringing out the person'a unity, reality, and volition, 
although Royoe does not use them. ot oourse, the transoendentals 
~1th Royce do not spring from an existential prinoiple; and, so, 
~h.,. must not be con1"uaed with the properties seen in the Scbalas-
~lc context. Then, finally, under volition tne lreedom and immor-
calitr ot the person, which acoording to Josiah Rorce are derived 
rrom will, will be considered. 
It will be pointed out that 1n Rorce's philosopnr the three 
rranscendcntal properties formall,. imply one an~~her. These im-
~11cations are so strong in Ro,.ce that he doe. not make the three 
~roperties explicitly dIstinct, tor he in no way bases AnT distinc-
lona on oognition and, correspondingl,., on intrinsic principles of 
being. .aturally, then, wIthout such distinctions the three 
ranlcendentals will tend to ruse formall,. into one. Since Ro,.ce 
lid not delve deepl,. into epistemology, he naturall,. does not de-
~lne "true" as relate4 to intellect. Theretore, he linds no need 
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o detine, in Ju.xtapositlon to "true," ugood" as !'elated to will. 
thermore, he ca.n derine f1 one" wi thout reference 81 ther to an 
xi.tential Judgment 01' to sense-experience, becau.se eve'l'7 t1'\'Ut 
be ane. Universal Ide.a, he aaY8, are true aa Indlvid~ 
but as intent10nal ther are only arbItrary vehicles tor 
Sinoe Royce 1. working In eS8entiallsm--that i& to sar, 
does not posit an intrinsic principle of a being tor its aot ot 
xiatlng--the transcendentala take on the characteristics ot Cunc-
I.e., wa7S ot operation, and lose their ontological status 
peculIar ch8l'acters ot exlstents. 
Since much has alreadJ' been I aid concerning one under the 
onslderatlona ot individuality and ident1ty, it wIll be only 
r1et11 regard.d here. 
In Rorce'. cont.~t. one mar be said to be that characteria-
at a .elt which distinguishes It tram all otner aelves. Each 
61ns. or lIelt, tor ROlce, i8 one. It bas an Ident1t7 all lts own 
~loh makes It an individual, While at the same time It finds 1ts 
in relation to the world. The union ot the .elf with the 
no waf contradiota the selt·s personal Ident1tr. There 
a one and only one notion applioable to a Stilt which 18 d.~lved 
om appreoiation, ot OOUl~s., and not trom abstractIon. That 1s 
ta internal .an1Da. No two selves can have the same internal 
It ROTC. adndtte4 a oyoll0 theo17 ot hlatol7, then 
pelve8 would no longel' be one. But he tlat17 denies such a view 
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ot history, and each self retains its uniqueness. If through 
repetition all the formal notes of a self were found in another 
self" there would be absolutely nothing to di!'ferentiate them. Hls-
tory is linear. The aelf has a pa8t, aa well as its present_ whicl 
gives it a unique role to play in the progression of the Absolute'. 
expression, the world. 
To be a 8elt, or in other words a being, one must strive by 
his own choice to achieve his ideal self. To be one, to fulfil 
oneta unique role in the world, one must be free, that is to S8.Y', 
one muat be able to ecquire the good of his own being. One 1m-
~lies good. To be one 1s the object of the selt's will. It is 
~he good desired. 
Our doctrine of individualitY' demands that every Selt 
shall be in 80me respect tree. Our doctrine ot the 
unity ot Beina implies that all Selves are known, with-
out any true .eparation, in the organism ot a single 
world 11te. And 80 flU" from there being an;}" opposition 
between the.e two aspects ot our idealistic realm, they 
are .t~ictl;y reciprocal aspecta. The20ne World and the tree tRdividual implr each the other. 
"Individuality is a catego17 of the satistied Will.") As 
~uch the proper way to come to an appreCiation ot individuality 
~ould b. through an activity ot the will, viz., love. ane best 
~ows another as an individual when he lo".s him or her. When one 
The World and the Ind1 vidual. II, 437. 
- --
p • .393. 
p. 432. 
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loves. he loves this individual and no other. Then. no other can 
take his or her place for him. "BUt I can MVElr discover. by m'f 
thinking prooess taken a a • \.len. what constt tutes their ina! vidual-
it,.. ,,4 Thus 1" i8 tJaat tor the hWUUl mind. wi th 1 ts dis tinct runc 
tiona of' knowing and w11Una. Indlv1duallt7 v111 always remain a 
uvateJ7, 11'1ng be10nd the centin.a ot det1nlt1ona. Gabr1el Marcel 
so_tIme atter R07ce f s death. v111 also exalt the ind1vidual aa a 
t; 
mrster" Which stand. above 80ciological oategori.s.* 
Although one 1n Royc.'. 8ystem logically ltapllea good, tru.e 
~ill be taken under oonaideration now tor rea.QQ. ot ~xpedl.noy. 
sinoe the consideratIon on the good will be mol'e involved th.an that 
Ion the tx-ue. To oomplete the 0Tcle. good iJaplles tJtue. Ii. true 1m-
plles one. It Will be .een later how th1. work. out. 
True, tor loree, meana to tunction .s a partial or total ex-
PNS8iOll ot the Abaolute'a total expresalon. All truth is &roundttC 
in W111.6 The truth of tacta 1s detePrd1Ded b.J "OUsht. H7 Thoae 
faot. are real WhIch enable one to tultll b1. purpose. Sinee the 
~xpPe •• Ion ot the Abaolute 1. compoae4 ot harmonized lndividuals, 
4Xb1d• 
-
SGabrlel Mareel, The !lat8~ ot BelBi (2 vols., oateway ed.; 
ph1oaSOI ael117 aegner,Compari7,9bO"). 
'A parallel with Royce'. notion ot truth may be round in 
'utaela's reotitudo. 
Anselm, BIt veritat_, Vol. I ot 028r. Omnia, ed. Prior at Abba. 
~eco.n1s (Seooo"l!, IlljSJ. chap. 1", pp. 180-81, chap. v!I.'"P. 1.0;. 
7ROJoe. p. 41. 
here oan be no conflict in true facts. If a fact ought to be, lr 
apropos, then 1t 1s true. 
on the other hAmu, in the World of Appreoiation, tho truth 
t tnternal meaning. 1. alao derived trom w1ll. What a self 1. 
n 1ta inmost .a.enoa 1. d.taradne4 01 the will ot the A.bsolute. 
hen one tr1e. to appr.olate the ultimate re.11t7 of a ~elf. he 1. 
e.kina to mow an expre •• lo11 or Will. So 1 t 1s that iii. purely In-
elleotual appx-cach oan not oome to tbe l'u11 tl'Uth of I'.all.ty. Fer 
Nal &ppreolat.1oa, one mUltt vollt1onallJ grup the othtu.~. 'I'b.at 
• to. &7, he III18t love the other aa 0JltI who is rult'lll1ng a dia-
inct pur-po •• 1n the Ab80lute IS expre •• ion. Such lov .. ' binds the 
vo 1n tn. one. and, .0, alao draws eaoh into a greater particlpa-
ot' Naliq. 
Abstractions ~r. determined by the interest ot tbe knower.8 
a penon cl .. 81£1.. taota i8 to"l11 up to hi. choice. The 
ten8ts which hi. world gives h1a guide. bis seleotion or eate-
However, 1t must not be thought that tbla subjectivism 
ana t1cUa. al'bltrar1ne... On the contra17, the enoia. wbich the 
ubj ••• makes tor ola.allieation 8hould be that moat apt in help-
ns hi. aohie.e bi. PW'po... The "ought," then, whioh r lows .f1"Om 
be Abaolute, 1naurea a kind ot atandard objectlv1ty tar tacta D.r 
ot the .ubJe.t, not the Obj80t.9 
8lbId., p. Sl. 
-
9Ib1d., p. ,2. 
-
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Tempors.llt7 iabound up in the war that men know realltr. 
The Absolute, on the other hand. sinoe he 18 in etern1t7, knowa 
a.ll real1ty in one eternal graap. He knows hi. ex.pression oom-
pletell, p.raolaely because he 1s his expression and. becauae he ha.s 
w111ed t..~1a .:!!. ... t_ .... c ... to;;. expreaaion into being. 
Hor.oyer, the comp.NMll8ive Jalowledge or tbe Absolute mean. 
that there 1. ab801ute truth. Although the Absolute'a lmowledge 
is j$pendent on the tree obol~ea or men, the truth ot their actlon 
la gl'ounc1e4 in an Abaolute. Truth 18 not II.Hly a 8uo.1eot1 v. mat-
tett which c an be aooepted Ql' not, .a one wishe.. Truth lf1USt oon-
torm to the Absolute who •••• all truth in an eternal now.10 
God knows each IncUvldual person. While 1t 18 true that Ood 
seea man In on. lnaipt, he alao a.e. the t..,ora1 aspeot 1n man. 
He knowa that man 18 one who must 8t1"l.e 1n ttMe toward hia ideal 
11 
seU. 
""'th, then, Gan b7 no _ana be 11m1ted to the region ot the 
8~nae.. NAll t!"utb. le the obJeot ot acknowledgement, and not mere 
12 17 ot immediate exper1enoe." ~ruth 11 •• deep.!" than the super-
lcial data, the given. It has tor it. ultimate source the Abao-
lute'. wIll Ite.l~. A. all things are only lnaorar as ther are ex 
so too, they are true only insofar as 
U 1b1d., p. 147. 
-12Ib1d., p. 1$'9. 
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b1 thelr purposes satiar" the Absolute's will. 
The person 18 at first ignorant of his true identity and in-
dividuality" although th.at 1s of prime Import tor Mm. ae cannot 
Icomprenenaib17 •• e hi. role in the world, ths.t i8 to aa7, how h. 
Iw!ll tuUll God's wlll. But he at 1eaat has the asauranoe of lmo' 
!s.ng that (Jod knows who he re.117 18. Secondly, the person knows 
that hi. truth can be bad only 1n unitlng hl. finit. will with 
OOd's. The person must retain a certain amount ot diasatiatactlm 
tor h. oannot •• e just how it ia that he 1. acquiring his individ-
ual!t1, hi. reality. But, tb1rd17. the p.rson does oome to aome 
appreclation of btmaelt. 
The knowing, hoW ...... that ltII will wins unique expression 
in rq ur., and 11'1 '1111 11fe a. dlstinct fzaom aU other 
1nd191dual l1ve., ls, IfsO faoto, ~ lndlvldual and con-
sclou8 knowing. nenc. n Goa. In the eternal world, and 
in unit7. y.t 1n contrast with all oth.er Individual livea. 
",. own lelt. whoae conac1ouanesa 18 118re &0 fl!cker1n6.~ 
attalna an Inslght into M7 own 1'8al1'1 and unlquenea8.~ 
He .ee. himself a. that which with certain improvementa tits into 
hi. world. That pr-oprlet1 1s nis Nalit,._ In Royce's early novel 
The Peud 01' Oak.f'1eld oreek,14 Harold 1s a &'Ood example of one who 
-_....... , 
flnda h1. troth by t'unct10ninc propol'17 in bi. collltluni t,... The 
truth of one.alr, however, can be tully known onlJ In the eternal 
world, ". • _ In OOd, ,. become aware of." flOW our Willa are t"ul-
t1lled through unlon with h1a •••• "1$ 
1) Ibld •• p. 434. 
-
14J081ah ROJee. The Peud. ot Oakf1eld Creek. A Novel of Cali-
tornia L1te (Boston. Hoiighton, -m.tf1!n and Company" taB?):--
lSH ce he Wor d and the d v d 
BOJroK 
In lOur eternal Wl10n wl th God you s •• what even ;your 
present 11r. and purposes mean; and they mean, even as 
they are, Intlnl tel,. more than TOur hUft" type or oon-
sclousnes. makes man1te.t to yourself. 
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Good is that which oompli.s with the Acaolute's wl1l tor It. 
Eve17 801t--i ••• , • .,.r7 b.mg--1. good in the sen.e that it ful-
t11s a purpo.e. E.,ery •• It 1s more or 1 ••• apt and propGr in the 
total structure. 
I 
£.81'7 •• 11" i8 good for t be whole and th.ere in 
ttnd. its own good. Man has a natural tenelenc," to s •• the pro-
pr1et7 or b.ing. and to will that propriety into existence. "For 
.. " 
the ought, .s auch, 1s fle.er -,.el1 tore1gn to M1' own will. "17 
The person know. that his oWn goodness 11e. within the Abso-
lute. He is good insotar &8 h8 1dentifie. hi. will to tl~ Abso-
lute t &. Goodne... then, 18 gN>unded in the Absolute. Even tbough 
~n 0 an ••• 11 ttle of lasting worth 1n their eph.emeral role., 
ne.erthele.s ther have the assurance tt~t their .nlue a. persona 
re.t. i..utable 1n the Absolute. 
--that rtfI' _aning, I s&7. whAn inolude' in one whole 
with all the.e endles& dlft8rences, 1. Identical with 
Ood'. will. But taken bJ 1q •• 11", as now I am, I am, 
Ind •• d, l'el'llOte epough, in rq passing consclousness, 
both trom MT own aelf-expression, and from mr tlnal 18 
conscious unlon wlth mT Othel', namely with the Absolute. 
16Ib1d., 
-
p. 436 •. 
l7Ibld., 
-
p. 35. 
18Ib1d., 
-
p. 37Q. 
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1i"reedom 
Royce strongly maintains that the person is free. }1an ls 
tree to become himselt. Positively, freedom ls connected with in-
dividuality. Precisely because a man is a lmlque individual he is 
free. 
Therefore are TOU in action Free and Individual, just 
because the unitT 01' the divine lite, when taken together 
with the uniqueness 01' this life, implies in every finite 
being just such essential originality of meaning as that 
ot which TOU are conscious.19 
The human sel1' must be tree to progress towards its goal or 
to ignore its goal. ne facto, there 1s sin and a lack of harmony 
-
in the human co_unitT. That can be attributed onq to an evil 
tin1te will. There would be a contradiction in saying that the 
Absolute wills the har.aon, 01' all selves in the community and that 
the same Absolute wills the .elve. not to be in harmony in the 
community. 
E! Jure, it the human selt was determ1ned to its perfection, 
there would be no morality. The "ought," which the aelf is con-
acious 01', would have no significance. Sin and virtue, the coward 
and the hero, would have no distinction. 
Freedom, however, ..... to mean for Royce much the same as i 
did tor Kant. Preedom i8 that condition in which a being is not 
latteoted or intluenced by external factors in ,cording to Royce, freedom is that possibility its activity. Ac-of the self by which 
, 
19 4 Ib1d •• p. 70. 
-
it can find expression for its internal meaning. No external 
actor affeots the selt t • expression ot ita internal meaning. 
71 
The problem then ot rq freedom i. s1mpl1 th.e problem 
ot mf 1ndlvlduallt.y. It I am I and nobody else, and it I 
.. I as an expression ot purpose, then I am in so tar fpee just beoause, a8 an Inibvldual, I express b,. ~ exIstence 
no w'.ll exoept Tff1 own. 
oodne&. 1s oloaelr tied in w1th treedom. Prect.ely beoause the 
I 
relt 1. tree. it can effeot good--the pr1!1'1a17 good etrect bei.ng 
rt. own realitr •. !,,'olat07 expressed it this.,.! "It goodno8s has 
aus.a, it 18 not f,oodne •• , it 1.t baa etrecta, a reward, it 1. not 
oodness e1ther. So goodne •• 1. outalde the chain of cause end 
trect. tt2l He mesne that no external oau •• b.J forcing Q will oan 
rins about a goed .tt.ct. The persOll must tr •• l,. of himself briqJ: 
~bout good. 
I The human vill, then, 18 tr .. with reapect to specification 
n the senae that no external t actor can Inhlbl t or corrupt the. 
our •• ot .he manta Identtt7, hi. totem.1 meaning. But 1t must 
ow be ••• n it the human will 1s inte~na1lJ tree, 1.e., whether 1t 
. ,
~ 
• autonomoua or not. 
In • moral act there 18 both an objectlve aspect and n Bub-
actlve one. ObJectivel1, the pet-8011 1s 1n a wot-14. There a cer-
s1n pl"opr1e't1 1. demanded ot him by the world itself. ,{e must act 
8. oerta1n way to 8.tla17 the "OUght" ihieh 18 presented to him .• 
ZOIbld., pp. ))0-)1. 
-
kork: 
2~o Tol.tOT, Anna Xarenlna, trana • 
The Modern Llbrar" 19~dJ, 'P. 925. 
Constance Garn.tt (New 
:': 
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he "Ougilt" is presented in the form.: "Harmonize thJ will with 
world's Will.,,22 The moral agent is able to appraise the sit-
ation in which he must act. If he could not, t hat he is a moral 
gent would be meaningless. 
And this indIvidual will of the agent must be so expressed 
in the deeds that 1n some genuine respect it lies with the 
agent himself to determine what nothing else 1n the world 
determines, namel.J, the right or wrong character of this 
deed, and its conformity or 2pn-conformit,y to the standard 
which constitutes the Ought. J 
is not the ltantian ttOugtlt" which Is a universal moral form. 
"Ought," which is incarnated in the world, in each instance 
s un1que11 significant for the person and tor t he world. 
One place where internal freedom shows up is in an act of 
For Ra,rce, sin is utter foolishness. It is not so much go-
ng agalnst same external mandate. It Is rather aoing against 
ne' s "fel"1 selt. '!he legislation as to what ls sin, then, is 
d11 lett to s ome arbltr&.r7 wl11. Sin is a denial of self under 
he illusion ot selt-aggrandizement: ftseeka to master the world 
n the service ot the mere caprice ot the selt."24 
Man intrinsicall., has treedom ot exercise. Han can sin not 
beoomins what he wishes regardless ot the Absolute's will. Man 
ana1n on17 bJ not beoom1ng what hi. ideal selt demands ot him. 
"To sin is oonaoiouall !2 ohooae !2. toret, througtl a narrowing ot 
22ao1ce, the World and the IndiVidual, II, .348. 
- --
2)Ibid., p • .34S. 
-24Ibid ., p • .3S0. 
-
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the field of attention, an OU~t th.at one all"ead7 reCOgnizes_,,2S 
Man can! brink real! t7 t or h1msel1". lie can 0 hooae not to. ~e the 
whole truth.. He etl11 isnore some ot I;h.e demands or h1e world. 1'0 
be OJ;' not to be 18 the option tor man. But be cannot glt'e to him-
selt anoth..,r internal nea.n1ns- Be cannot rind his Identl tl. his 
real! t1 accox-dilli to &n1 purpoae. me one which he baa. Which wae 
ol'dalned b7 the Absolute. alma conta.1na 111s Identlt,. 
Sin in its intention 1s not only opposed to the trutn of the 
person, but it is alao tfworld-d •• troJing ... 26 It undermines the 
YDl"1 struoture 01" ~allt7. Conaelcuaq to act out 01" vlcioua ig-
norance i8 dlametrloall.:' oppoaed to that goo4ne •• wh.1oh give. the 
world ita being. Bowever, precisely because 1t 18 f1nite, the per 
VGl'sion ot a bUlUlll will does not deatrOJ' the world, nor does It 
e •• 11 s.t the world ajar. TPUe, the s1nner haa tailed to fulfil 
hls role in the Absolute's expre.sion. But the 81nner is not 8e 
important us be 'l.fIIIi."I tb1nk. God do". not need h1m. He needs God. 
Altb.oush 004 would 11ke him to tunction properlT ... ·wh1ch is clear 
from the It.ct t!mt he made the man wI tn bia own lnte:m.al l'4ean1ng-
he 1s flot at a 10a8 when the man goea aatrar. B1 the etemal w1a-
dom ot the Absolute, the other me.vers of the world must and do 
compenaate' tor th. loa. in expression :re.ulting trom the sin: 
{"everl !!!! de.~ ~ 8.(.'l;J'AeW~ .. rf' !!:.!! 2 !.2!!. !!!!. ~ atoned tor. 
... .. . 
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!!?l. !.2!!!. other .2!! .2 apnt, !! !l2l !!z .:!!!!. a§e,!~ .bJ~~l.t:, • • • 
.~)27 The ain brlngs about a whole 8et ot ~eaotlon~, wtdcA over-
oome its objectlve harm in the world-order. "A. an ev1l, it can-
not exlat In laolatlon. Its supplement appear. In the torm of 
deeda ot atonement, repare;tlon, control, condemnation, and In the 
end, tu1tllment.-28 
In splte of the tact that &).1 _n :tI1UIIt atru.ggle with. vil, 
muat fight to keep thnulelv •• open to reallt7, ea,.. Royce, the 
world as • whole, vi •• ed from the standpoint ot etern1t7 1. a 
100<1.29 Ifbe .trl.1ng to tultil the "OUght" resulta In good. That 
man 1s able thua to acquiN his own Identl t7 and that ot the wox-ld 
1s to hi. glor;r. 
PbJalcal .vl1 results trom aome def1clenol •• in the flnlte 
ox-de •. , nob 10. the Absolute. It thlnp SO wrong, 1 t 1s because 
aome finite Will 1. malfunetlon1n&. Royce 8.18 "that all 111 tor-
tune result. tttom the detect., or at leaat t)!'lom the detective ex-
pre.s1on,ot scae tlnite wl11.")0 Thus, in no w~ can e.il be at-
tributed to Ood. God 1. all-good. 8Ince .a Absolute Will he 1. 
the .ouro. ot good. All tinite belnga are good anlr insofar aa 
tbe7 an e,xpre •• lonll ot God. f. will. IJ.'!wa it 18 that e.l1, ':t1 the 
'far., m.eanJ.n& ot tbe wo1'4, .wat be •••• re4 .tI-Om God. "5?n18 ev11 1. 
27Ib14., 
• • 
p. 368. 
28Ib1d., p. 371. 
29Ibld •• 
-
p. 379. 
30Ib1d., p. 390. 
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not 1n any aen •• in God, nor Tat 1n the world by anJ d1vine ean-
sentI but 1s 1n a be1ng who, in b.1a fr •• dom, 18 now wholl,. Inde-
pendent of God or of any other moral agent."31 
,be world .a 1t now 18, that ta', a8 a not Tet completed f'ul-
f1lment ot the Abaolute'. wl11. 1. a good. There la no omega polni 
wbere the world wl11 tin4'lta gO~8 •• J2 Rather, it la good here 
and DOW aa partlal tulEllment. So too, the persOll, though not ,.et 
full,- de.eloped. though not yet a complete expreaslon of hia in-
ter%W.l meaning. 1s a go04. 
IlSo!'tall!l 
Ar1:T aet ot a person bas the character ot the eternal at 
leaat In thia aenael 1t 18 an expresalon ot the at.ronal w111 of 
the Absolute. The act haa pl.,ed a unique role whIch stands as an 
tntesPal part ot the Abaolute'. 8xp~881nn tor all t1me.33 
An ethieal .elt' need be iatlortal. R07C8 aqa tnat it would 
be a contradtctlon to. &7 that an • thl!Ja 1 •• 11' haa .tull,. aocompl1lb ~ 
ed It. puz-po.e. 
POl" that 18 ot the •• ry •••• no. of Ethical Seltbood. 
~17, to press on to new t.aka, to demand new op-
pOP~lt1 tor .erYI,., and to acoept a new roaponsl-
bl1lt)" " th .".17 lnatant.34 
It tne .\hloal •• It w.~ to ~ ou\ ot opportunitle., i ••• , ceaa. 
to be able to tun.\lon .a an ethloal .elt, It could not ha"e been 
)lIbld •• p. )99. 
-
32Ibld., p. h21. 
-33Ib1d •• p. 429. 
~ru; .. D. 11'0 
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ethica.l in the :first place. The ethicfll self' must place hilUelt 
1n relation. to the whole order 01' good. Slnoe he never full,. 
schi ••• s hi. end, he 1. sustaine. in temporal exl.tence by that 
.nd wblch 1. oOlUltltutlve ot hi. ethical nature. Ethieal, i.e., 
baving a :ree-will, lmpli •• immortality. 
In three cona14eratlona, R07ce ap.,. .. ob.ea the question 01' 
h.UItaA tm.ortallt,.. ae hope. to .how that IIBcrtallt,. 1. a logical 
implioatlon in hi. dootrine ot ~lng. Ue do •• not ctter Q deduc-
ti.. argument which v 111 be 006en1; to &n1' mind, onl1 tor tho.e 
who )r,nov R07ce'a oonception ot bel.ng wtll hi. "le •• on bnortallty 
be mean1ngtul. Thull, while looJd.ng at hi. oonatderationa, the 
baekgroun4 ot hi. _t:aph.Ysle. mu.t be kept in aincJ.. 
The tirst approach that Ra,rce take. toward exposing human 
baortall t1 l.fount! ... d 111 God. The human. elt 1. an. expression, 
though partial, ot 004 !'d.mae 11' f in the mantler alread7 d •• cribed. 
Aa suoh 1t ahare. in t11e bamortallty ot God. To be immer8ed in 
another •• It, a. vaa explained earlier, b7 no means 4 •• tr078 one'B 
own .elt. It 18 quit. compatible, acoording to R07ca, tor the 
h.uman • eU '0 ha". ita own proper ext.tence in the self ot God. 
What we 80 tar a ••• rt 1. that. in God, .".r,r individual 
SeU, ho .... v.r lnalp1tloant Ita temporal endurance ftlaJ 
seem. eternally pos •••• ea a £orm ot conaoiou.nes. that 
i8 wnol17 other than this our preaant fliokerlng torm ot 
mortal conaolou.nea.. And now, precisely auoh an a ••• rt-
1011 1s inde.d tOt. 'oeg1nn1ns ot Q philosophio.l conception 
of' I:DaO~talit7.35 
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Royoe would saT that such an immortallt1 retains personal 
1dentlty. In tact, to exist ill God conec:'.ously the person has an 
•. waNines. of hi' true sel~ and not just the pflrtlal view of sel.f 
expertenced In t1me. 
We ourselY •• , and not mere17 other lndIvldual., become, 
In God. cansclous o~ what we are, beoAu8e, in God, we 
become aWQre at how our w1111 are tulfilled through our 
unton vttb ~, and ot bow hls Will wina 1ts lat1efaction 
only" by v1rtue ot our unique share In the whole • .36 
The •• cOlld approach ot HOrCH' views death .s the mere passlng 
ot tiL more partioular se11' into a greater 8titlf. Much a 8 our p~s.­
ins ide.s by d7ing take on significanoe in the integral p&raon, 
our temporal 11Y.8 by teJtndnatlna take on signiticanoe in the tn-
tesral •• It of etepnit7. 
Fot- ua, to be _a na to tultil a purpose. 11" death. 1. 
real at all, It js real onlJ In .0 tar .s It tultI1s 
a pw.-poae. But '.0", wbat purpose can be tulfilled 01 
tbe ending o~ a llte Who •• purpose le eo tap unfulfllled, 
I anever at once, the p\U'pct'. that can b. rultl118d 07 
the ending ot suoh a 11t. 18 neee •• arlll' a purpoae that, 
in the eternal 'World, ls Qoft8cioualy 1m2 and •• en fll 
eggtlguoua vi th, I.!!.. !.!. l~l~.l"e !?I. -.!. 'iii7spii-l7 whoe.. M?lt_n~ Yii ~poztal ~ •• ~ e.emlt ~ cut shopE. 
Death, then, la in no sense the annlb1latlon o~ the ~p8on. 
~8tb.l', It la onG more step, by which t be person enteros Into a new 
\ 
~ha.e ot hi. existence. 
~he pos.lbility ot death depends upon the tranacending 
of de •• h througb a 11t. that 1. richer and more consolous 
than 18 the lit. which de.th out. ahort, and the rlcber 
11f. 1n question 18, in .eaning, it not In temporal 
)6I 'Dld. 
-
31IbId •• p. 440. 
a.que.oe, oQBtinUOu8 wi th the verr 11fe that death 
interrupts.'" 
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In the comprehen.1vevlew of the person, death takes on a 
po.lttv. meaning which 18 hidden trom the vlew or temporallt,. 
Man •••• now through a glaa. darkl,. !he tJ'Uth ot a mathemat1cal 
tuDot1on--e.g., t(x,7)--tranacenda it. meanlng at an7 particular 
polnt--e.g., (xl' 71). Ind.ed, the point baa Ita t~le identity 1n 
teJtma 01' the tunctlon. '.rhe point laolated trom the tntegration is 
LRalgn1tloant. The tlnalit7 ot death 18 not ao muoh that 1t bringa 
to en .nd but rather than it ope lUI t'or greater f'ultilment ot' pur-
poee. 
For our tbeor, implle. that when I dl., r.rq death 1s pos8ible 
1.\8 It real t'aet onlJ in .0 tar aa, in the eternal world, at 
80_ time arte" death, an individual 11 vea who oonsc1ously 
aay81 "It was rrq 11r. that there teAporal17 te.rm.nnted 
\.IIU'ln1almd, 1 t. meaning not e.bod1ecl in 1 t. .axpfJ.rienoe. 
But I now, Inrq hlp:r S.lt-expresslon, ••• wh7 and how 
this was h, &Dei in God I attaIn, utb.e1"'W1ae, JIll 1'ulr11ment 
and 'fI7 peac •• ""9 
In hi. thlPd approach to h\UlaJl lJuaortall tJ', R07ce vlow. the 
~trdo.l peraon .a an Int1D1t. ae~1.8 ot' moral acta. The ethical 
~raon oan never s.7 enoUCh, tor that would b. to Ignore the de-
~and. 01' Ntalit7. 1 •••• to .1n. HAn ethical taak 1 •••• entlal17 
pn. at w.b1oh I oan nev •• a.,.. 'K7 work 1a t'inlsbed. I .,40 
Aa an ethical per.on. a man mu.at aot moral17 every time that 
38Ib1d., 
-
p. 441. 
39Ib1d., 
-
p. 443. 
40Ib1d., 
-
p. 444. 
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ne is confronted with a new situatlon. aa muat at least love thia 
new world in which he tird 8 himself_But hia moral activlt)" Itael. 
intluence. the world in such a wa.., that it 'becomes other them what 
it wa. befoN hi. activIt..,_ Theref'ore, he is t aced with a new de-
mand, because ther. i. a new world tor hi. moral aotivit,.. '1'he 
ethical person i. caught, happi17 enough tor him, acoording to 
R07ce, in an infinite .er188 of Jaoral acta _ For him to come to a 
term1nua would be a contradiotion fop hi8 ethical nature. 
son t • obll8~tion to aot MCl"allJ In.ure. bi. Immortallt,.. 
»Tom the • tan4point ot tempOl'll11 tl, the ethioal pit rson is 
lzaao.rtal in the .en •• tlult he must e .. er act anew ethical17. li. 
muat ~ i""epre •• nt.d by an 1n.tlnit ••• ,.,.... Ind •• d, Royce point. 
out, we never f;x.perience an individual wbe is full, expressed. 
There i8 alwaY8 the po.sibi11 t7 tor more. 
'rhat the IncU.vldual lIte ot allot ua Is not Bo_thing 
11.1 ted in 1. ta temporal expl"8s.1on to t he lire that nO~J 
we experience, tollows trom the vel'T tact that fi!re 
. nothing tinal or 1ndlvidual 1s tound expre •• ea.}-
Prom the 8 Landpolnt ot etem! t7, the ethical person 111 an 
Int.ara1 one who stands 1n hi • .full 81gn1f'1cance eternally 1n God. 
IRe 11i an infinite ~t1on, 'Whioh is comprehended u.nder one llotion 
wldoh contains the character or the infinite. the ideal stllt. As 
~a. explain$d earlier. there can be many partial Int1nit~a. tinite 
eth1cal selves. and only one tot£\l Infinite. the Abaolute. 
In or1e1". ttJ.en. Royce in tw/ee ways shows the; t V1&tl' b Wlion 
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Fit ttl Oed implies hia immortality: (1) the fact that nw"u has his 
ldentity in him, (2) that a part1cul&r 8el~ can eme~t~ into a 
larger selt without Its annihilation, (3) that no ethicAl selt can 
rull7 accomplish ita purpoae.42 
As to wb&t the tuture lite may be. Rorce does not wish to 
speculate. 11e 1".el. th~t it i8 outside of the boundaries ot phi-
l.osopby. Man IlNSt h'Ulllb17 await the t\ltlWe in I tOI'. tor hi., wh.ere 
t4e 1$ to flnd hi. true ldentlt,' and 1'lApplnea •• 
I know not in the leaat _ I pretend not to guess, 
b7 What proces ••• tnt. Indlv14ualit7 ot our ~n 11t. i. 
t'uJ.-ther expressect. lo1het.ner through man,. tl'lbulatlons a. 
here. or whathel' by a more direot road to indlvld\U.l.l ful-
fillment and peace. I know onll' that our vnrioWl mean-
lnp, throup What •••• Yiol •• 1tud •• ot' f'oz-1Nr18, consciously 
come to vhat 'We lnd1 vidual17, and OOd 1n whom alone we at'e 
Individuals, shall toaether resaN lUI the atta1runfm.t of 
our unlque place, J\Ild ot' our true z-elat1onshipa both to 
other indlyiduals anC to to. all lnclusive Individual. 
God. MueU. F\U'tbel' !rito the ocoult 1 t 1. not t he buai-
ne.s of phllo.opbJ' to go. HJ neareat friend. are al-
ready, as we have seen, ocouJ.t enough t'or r.. l walt 
until their ItOnal ahall put 0Il--Ind1v1dua11ty.43 
Hr. Cotton, I thJ.nk. haa not ole&r17 enoup 41at1naU1ahed 
~he Viewpoints ot t!me trom that ot at.mltT 1n nOloe'a phl1osopa,. 
fl7 coatualng the two outlooks. he has laid Royoe open to his chitrgel 
~ha' tbe human pepson doe. not retain personal taBortalltr and that 
~oJ'.el. intereno •• tor 1""8.11'7 5.1"8 lnvalld.44 
42ROl'ce, !!:! W'crlq !.2!!.a! p!dlv1dua.l, Il. 445. 
43110108 , ~ conceRtlo.!!. 2! Immortalltz, p. 60. 
44Jlullliua Ha"7 cotton, R&iti' on tht Human Self (CRmbridge, ~aa •• ohua.tt., Bcu.-varc1 Un1..... ,-rr.ii; !'JS1i' ,pp: 1$4-55. -
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Royce's statement,s will retain thelx- vplidity if one real-
izes that in the temporal order the selt he.s . nClt acoomplished its 
goal. its ideal selt, and alao thlt in the ete~al ox-del" the selt 
1s tully expressed a8 par-t ot t he Absolute's total expression .. 
~ternity tranecenda tImeJ but it d08S not negate it. What 1s to 
be worked out temporally cannot be superseded by its actual1ty in 
~tel'nit7. 
!'lb.. temporal, viewed tl'Om eternity. ia sublated, but not de-
atrOTed or eliminated. !rne eternal, viewed trom time, is real as 
II signlticant component in 1'in1 t@ functioning. That tl» eternal, 
~he infinite, the ideal will always be approached but never attain-
~d in tlme does not d18s01ve the eternal into nothingness. The 
~ternal i8 constitutive ot the tinite; and, 80, it 18 just as real. 
ro do justice to Royce-s ph11oao~, we must maintain both point. 
ot view. 
The human pel'son i. one, an individual. He is an individual 
by reason of" his PUl"POS8, which t lows trom the good will ot the 
~b.~lut.. The Absolute. in willing the person into being by g!v-
ng hi. a purpose. has given the person his own proper identity, 
11s ultimate rea11t1, his truth. The person, by being true to b1m-
~elt, makes himselt t.te Wlique Indl vidual that God wants h1m to be. 
Man'a freedom, identlt7, and immortal1ty are entWined, for 
~ 1s t"l-e. to acknowledge the 1ndi" iduali t1 of ethers. He 1s tree 
~o enter the world of appreciation where 10"8 b1nds individuals to-
~ard their mutual perteotion a8 the expression ot the Absolute. 
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Man is .free to aoquire his own tru.e 1denti ty by living in oon.form-
it)" to the "OUght." Man is :.ere. to make himself an individual 'b7 
uniquely joining the unitr of the world. He is tree to determine 
his degree of immortality. 
CHAPTER V 
A CRITIQUE ON ROYaE'S HOTIO. OF THE KUMA. SELF AS 
PRESENTED II' THE WORLD AlID THE DIDIVIDUAL, VOL. II 
........ d.----. -......-
This 1. the la.t phase o~ thi. endeavor to pre.ent R07ce'. 
otlon o~ the hWJlll.n • elf. A ori t ique of H07ce' s doc trine of the 
uman • elr will be given here. It i. hope' that the essentials ot 
s doctrine have alrea47 been presented In the previous chapters. 
owever inadequatel,.. ThrougBout this work, a primary concern has 
.en to bring out the metaphysioal basis and significance ot Rqrce. 
It is hoped that bJ now it is somewhat clear that Boyce' 
.elr," "co_unit,., tf • purpose ,ff "Absolute," etc. are not nwl'e arbl 
ra'1!7 concepts, but that the7 are .. ant to indicate the true strue 
In thls chapter, some of the most often used 
abels for R07ce's philosoPQr will be conalaered briefl,.. Then, 
look at the pro's and con's ot his s7ste., as pertalning to the 
person, will be taken. Finall,., a word will be mentioned 
the significance of Ra,rce for the world. 
One ot the dangerous pitfalls tor historians ot philosoptv' 
s to categorise a philosopher with a readT-made label. The rea~ 
that tne desoription ot a philosopher demanda tail-
red wording, tor it he i. a philosopher of any con.equence his 
8) 
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thought i8 a unique contribut10n to the progress of ideas. Four 
name. are often given to Royce'a ph1loaopbJ: idealism, pantheism, 
voluntarism, Begelianiam. .ov a considerat1on of those ready-made 
labela and an attempt to point out their inadequacies vill be pre-
sented. 
IDEALISM 
Idealia. appear. in two distinct, though parallel, avenues oj 
ph1loaophJ. It can appear 1n epistemologf or in metaphyaics. 
Royce, In The World and the Individual and previous works, 
-.....-- . 
haa done little tovard working out a detailed epistemology, al-
though in later works he did aetthe general framework ror his 
~pistemoloS1. Pieroe aa.lsted Royce in developing his epi8temol~ 
~ provIding him with the Idea ot interpretation in ita triadio 
.tructure. But, even that could hardly be-called a detailed epla-
temolog. Perhaps, the la~k ot a well thought out theory or cogni-
tion 1s the greatest det1eiency in Royce'. ph11osophJ. 
It Royce is denominated an idea11st, the term muat be taken 
in the metapn,sical senae. Idealism, taken metaphySically, is the 
~1ew that all reality 1s of the same attlft aa .pirit. In such a 
~iew, matter lo.e. its prima:rr role .s a basic prinCiple and is 
reduced to a certain kind ot spiritual dete:rm!nat1on. Royce's 
~tapbJsical idealism, it should be pointed out, is in the frame-
irFork ot the Absolute--t1ni te polari t7, which 11 as considered 1n 
~hapter I. 
If one were to ask RO)"ce whether he were an idealist or not, 
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o.e would unabashedl,. answer that he was. But what doe. idealism 
_an? If it •• ans juat a denial ot matter, then surely Royce would 
tit under thia heading. But it by idealism one meana the denial 
of all objective reality, i.e., all reality other than the subject, 
ROTce would hot be an ideallst. Certainl,. Royce admits the r8a1itJ 
ot other tinite .elve. and ~lso the Abaolute. Perhaps, then, one 
could call hi. an objective 1deallst. 
one mli:y -fu.l"ther ask: is there arq signlficant difference be-
tveen an obJeotlve ideali.t and a realist' Eaoh adDdts the truth 
of other beings. Indeed, it aeell18 that the role the realist gives 
to matter 1s actually satisti&d in the idealist's phil080phT by 
some sort ot functionary form. Also, the rea11st himself will ad-
mit that he cannot 8trict17 de tine matter, because a.n'1 definite de-
termination does not pertain to matter qua matter, that is to s ay, 
1t cannot reveal the :full meaning of' prime Dlat'Cer. Voltail'e, in a 
~oment of mockery, threw that very thins in the tace of philosophlr~. 
ifhe pb1losophera all spoke at the same time a8 before, but the,. 
ilere allot difterent opinions .,,1 Again, he write.: "'lheD rYou 
:ion t t know what l1wtter is."2 
Jfevertheless, upon investigation, it must be a ald that there 
1. a ~ery deep significance which severa the two schools ot philo.-
op.tq'. The realist hold. tilat matter is e tru., intrinsic prinCiple 
ot a material being, that it i. the potency which canleCeiY8 torms 
lvoltaire, "Ki.rome§&8,- ed. Walla.e Powll. (Prench Storie., 
~ew York, Bantam, 1960), p. 38. 
2 Ibid., p. 40. 
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and which limits the being by restricting the kind of ita form and 
so, too, the being's act ot exiatence. Ot course, that presentntta. 
1s backwards in that the being is !:'irst had, then its principlE~8 
are found through analYkis. Some realists (Thomists) wo~ld say 
that the principle ot indivIduation for a material being is ultl-
Ina tell" matter. 
The realism which ROTce more directly opposes 1s empIrical 
realism rather than tho.ism. Royce react. against the pOSition 
that the I'esl is the empirical and that aa.l other knowledf,e is In 
the order ot mental constructs. The real for Royce 1s not divorcee 
trom mind. The real 18 mind under the appearance of purpose. 
The idealistie denies any ind.terF~nate principle for. be-
ing. He must, theretO!" e, look elsewhere tor hi. principle of In-
~lv1duatlon. IUs prinCiple wlll be tormal} and, so, the 1ndi vidual 
~s Beenas such because of' hiB place in .. system. How tll.e individuAl 
~8 to tlmetion in a tormal system. i. preeiae17 what lnS.kes him an· 
~ndlvidual. ROTce's prinoiple of Individ.uation i. pu.rpose, which 
lsauw~s ita ch~act.r in terms ot the whole system ot the Absolute. 
When the idealist vlew. the individual .a functioning In a 
~articular place and a t a particular ti_, be haa Il0t bridged the 
~ap between himself and tr. reali.t who sa78 that tbe material be-
~ng Is oomposed ot primary matter and substantial torm. However, 
M has b:rought the two schools ot thought a bIt oloser together. 
rhat, at least, Royoe has done. His IdealIsm apeaks in straight-
rorward WGrlts Vlthout QD7 mystical ob.curi t7- He tried to explain 
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the world as he tound it. He tried to pierce the surface of ex-
perienoe to elements more fundamental to the human 11 a'1 of lite: 
1098, loyalty, selt, God. !Hs honest attempt at disclosing the 
truth of res.lity can hardl,. be ignored, even by those In the real-
ist's osmp. 
Al though RO'1ce pr1me.rI1r direct..ed hi. oharges against the 
realism ot Positivisllt ~.nd CrItical Reallsm, he also had in w.nd 
Schol~8tici.m. Becau •• of that, ~cr on. reason, his criticism mar 
be thought 1n terms ot Soholsstic Realism. Also, Royce's 1dealis. 
is more vividly delineated against the baokground ot Scholastic 
RealIsm. 
PAJi1'HEISM 
otten the oharge 1s laid aga1nat ROTO. that he 115 a panth.eist 
It would be good now to go into a briet coneideration of this seo-
ond label, Vb.lob.. it will be eventually ooncluded. is misleading. 
~ vay of detIn1t1on, pantheism 1s the beli.t that the universe 
Itaken as a v_Ie is God. Adm1ttecllT. Royce does leave hiueli' ope~ 
to the charge ot pantheis.. It ba. be.n ••• n that the d1atinotlon 
betveen tinite beings and God in Hoyoe's pb11~soph7 i8 a b1gblJ 
retined notion and i. not e .. 117 grasped on tirst aoqua1ntance. 
Sinoe Royoe oall. une unive~.e the expreaaIon ot God or of the Ab-
solute. God, tor him, takes on IdentIt, in the particula~ determin-
ation. of the tinite being.. In that .en.e. God 1& identlfied wItt 
~s tinlte expressiona. However, tor Royce the Individual finite 
~eing retains ita own personal realit7 while at the same time it 
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the meaning or that reality only 1n terms ot the Absolute, 
Royce thinks that the torm ot the expression 1s determined 
the tree choice ot God, which 1s made in eternity, i.e., tran-
endentally to the temporality ot the expression itself. God's 
11 transcends the tinite world; and, so, God 1a not determined b 
tin! t e being. 'l'hus, It seems that Royce draws an extremely tine 
istinction between the Absolute and its expression. only 1n 
8ns.--as was pointed out in a prevIous ehapter--c9n the expre8s!cn 
e said to be identifie. with the Absolute. 
It seem. that to label Royce a pantheist is misleading al-
hough in some sense it may stand. Also, auch terms as monist and 
anp.lchist should be applied only with reservations. 
once again let it be pointed out that there are two view-
oints which must be taken to bave a tull appreciation ot Royce's 
hilosophy. The viewpoints ot the finite selt and ot the Absolute 
erve as a dialectic in Roycels philosophr in auch a way that each 
omplements the blas ot the other. Certainly, fro. the viewpoint 
t the tinite 8elt. Royce's philo8oph)r ls not a pantheism. The 
18 all t7 ot the pepson nevep dls.01y •• , top R07CII, 1nto that ot the 
The hl.1l'i18n person, becauae he consciously directs himselt 
his own personal and, by nature retains his personal iden-
Hi8 internal .eaning, although it servII. the purpose of the 
bsolute, is the mants own identity as un indiVidual. 
On the other band, however, trom the Viewpoint of the 
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Absolute. the meaningtulness of the .elt la that lt ls an expres-
slon of the Absolute. The ldentl tJ' of the fln! te aelt has slg-
nltlcant reality on17 in the Identlt7 of the Abaolute. It would 
be too almple to. a7 that the finite belng i8 the Absolute. It ma 
be said that le tunctlona aa part ot the Absolute. In that sense, 
R070e does verge on panthelsm. Again, that ls but one aspect ot 
two. When Roree' s ph1loaoph7 ls seen trom both vlewpoints, the 
term panthelsm dOH not a.em to give a true lndloatlon ot his phi-
losopbJ'. 
8070e has pres.nte. his conception ot the relatlon ot God 
ani :fln1te a.lves ln hla explanatlon ot the structure ot the Abso-
ute. fhere he pointe. out that God, whose torm ls expressed 'bJ' 
of reall ty, ls a real Self and men, 'bJ' reason of thelr 
onaoloua strlvlng to fUlfll thelr unlque purposes, are real .elvea 
lthl.n the Selt. Henoe, to present 80708 with a questlon on creation 
ould be the s.. aa asklng Borce to leave the context of his own 
h11oaopbJ ln order to thlnk with conoepts of another philosophic 
onten. R07C8 doe. not speak of the creatlon of the •• It bJ the 
bsolute ln oause-ettect terma, tor he conoelves ot oausatlon muoh 
s Kant did betore him. Creatlon ls a conoept whioh arlses in the 
ontext ot causatlon. Por R070e, the origin ot finlte be1ng 18 no 
oncelved ot 1n terma ot ereation, except b7 analogy. As an ldea 
a crea ted b7 the mind ot an to express the man t s meanlng, ln much 
he same manner man 1s oreated b7 the Absolute to express Hls mean-
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It 1s important to note here, in passing, tlif!t,t there 
arent levels in thirUdng. At times, it can l~ppen tbet two atate-
in their derivative form are quite ditrerent, although 1n 
prime meaning the, are actually the sa.e. Paul Till1cn polo 
ut that, when the oause category 1s superseded uy a more tunda-
ntal conception of creatlon, that which is at the prime 
e understood only symbolically at the derivative level. 
And it" this is done and is understood, the diff'erence be-
tween substance and causallty disappears, for it God is 
the cause ot the entire series ot cause. and effects, he 
is the SUbstance underlJlng the whole process ot becoming. 
But this "underlying" doe8 not have the character of' a 
substance Which underlies its accidents and which Is oom-
pletely expressed by them. It i8 an under17ing in which 
Bubstance and accidents preserve their f'reedom. In other 
word., it i8 substanoe not as a category but as a symbol. 
ADd, it taken aymbollcallJ, there 1. no 4itterenoe between 
priia oausa and ultima substantia. Both mean, what can be 
ca e. In a more dIreotXi .,a60XIc tera, "the creative and 
abysmal ground ot being. In thls term both naturalistio 
pantheiam, based on the category ot substance, and ration-
alistic t~eism, based on the oategorr of cauaallt7, are 
overoome. 
Perhaps, then, 1n view ot Tll1ioh'a statement, panthelsm 
hould be applled onlJ 87Mbol1ca1l7 to R07ce's ph1loaopn,. Tll-
lch t s vlew la mentioned 1n order to point out the possibll1t7 of 
more bas1c level than the pantheism/theism dlchotomf so as to 
ard of't a haat7 use ot labela, which are otten 80 general, and, 
vague that they beco .. insignlticant and deceptive out ot 
ontext. The author ot this paper, however, prescinds from the 
3paul Tlllich, s,atematlc Tn-oloST, (Chlcago: Unlverslt,r ot 
hicago Press, 19S1), , 238. 
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question ot whether !rilltoh is right or not. ror hls aim is to 
stir on8 to ret'leetic,n oberer. an applioation or pantheism is made 
to Royce's syataR. 
VOLUN'l'ARISH 
Voluntari8m i8 the theo1'7 that will ia the doa1nant :factor 
1n experience or in the const1tution of the world. Secause Royce 
did la7 great stres. on the role or w111 as the ultimate source ot 
reality. his pbilosoPQr may be said to be a kind ot voluntarism. 
However, one ought to specify the place will bas 1n Royce's syste. 
Will is the ultimate principle of reality for each individual, in-
cluding the Absolute himself. precisely because each individual is 
iD_ing because or an. a ot of will. In the case ot a fin! te being, 
the Absolute. by willing the actuality of a particular expression, 
bring8 into being that individual whose identit7 is found 1n hi. 
purpose tor being. i •••• to achieve the ideal aelt willed to him 
as his own by the Absolute. In the case ot the Absolute, he wills 
hi. own existenoe necessari17. Since he is hia Ideal self as he 
eternally exista, the Absolute wills to maintain, not to create 
anew, his perfeotion. Certaln17 his willing ot hi .. elt is ot his 
~erT nature. but it is also identical with him. Aocording to 
~OTeets conception of being, a thing exists if It has a purpo.e. 
lhe purpose ot the Absolute is to be himself; that Is his being. 
rhe purpose ot the Absolute's wIll is to maintain the Absol~te's 
existence or that the Absolute maT be himselt. Since, then, the 
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purposes of the Absolute ",nd 01' hIs will are identical_ the Abso-
lute 1. identloal with his will. 
W1ll, howevEu;-, vaa nevel' lert to b11nd haphaaardness il"! 
ROTC.'. ph1lo8opbr. Will was always guide. '07 the intention of 
the Absolute. In. Abeolute In eternl't7 wIlled hi. own expression 
acoording to hi. Intention. Pintte .elv •• wIlled th .... lv.. into 
sreatel" p8.J'ltlcipatlona or "alltT '01' apprecIating the A.bsolute fS 
purpose •• it became apparent 1n tne world.. No doubt, wl11 is the 
ultimate principle or rful11'7 tor ftc7ce. Since, the, the opera-
tion 01' the will in the Cftse ot the Ab.clute and or fInite beings 
Is guided br an intelligent vlt)w towarc! eo_ end, vo11 t1011 suppose. 
intellection. In af'f1rJ1ing the pnorIt7 ot vill In his philo8oplq' 
Rcye. neither negatee nor diaparae;ea intellect, whoe. opEtratlon 
though di.tinct !'rom 'Will's harm.on13e8 with 'to{ll1 in appreclatlon. 
Ho,."e would s81 wlth 1!homaa A KempIa: HI would rath.~ feel eom-
punctlorl than GOW its def'ln1t1cn.,,4 Yet, as hI. lIte of phlloa-
oPtv' bears witne8S_ he 'Would alao t17 Intellectualq to appreelR.te 
compun.otion. 
The ultimate Will ia Identic~l with a subsistent person, the 
Abaolutf1. woo conaeioUBlJ dIrects the fora of fInite being. jihen 
411 the nuanoes teund In the whole context bave been nl5tde somewhat 
explioit, w111 _1' be said to be the ultimate principle for H01ee. 
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HEGELIANISM 
ROTce, 1 t can be s aid without doubt, waa greatl,. Int"lueneed 
by the Hegelian I,.atem, which he studied, as well as those ot Kant 
and Piehte. However, it 1t Is otten misleading to label a philos-
opher with a 'Jpe title, it is even more misleading to label one 
philosopher with the name ot another. Yet, In so .. sense, Royce 
ma,. be called '1::! Hes.:-lian, provided that that senae is clearly in-
dicated. It 1s preterable, however, not to label ROTce an Hege~n 
r,rhe major influence in R07ce's thought certain17 was not H.~el. 
Peirce and James are much more sign1tlonnt. Indeed, Royce's ear17 
religious environment probablr contrIbuted BOre to his phllosop~V 
than did Hegel. The ditterences tound In the two s7atems ROTce 
~nd Hegel into d1tterent c&Cps. 
Now 1t would be good to lo<>k at some of the points ot dit-
Iteroence In the two nen's ph110sophies and then some points or s1mi· 
larlt~. Hegel places the ultimate principle ot re&11t7 in the unl· 
~ersal. He calls this universal "Spirit." It 1s a concrete unl-
~er8al, that 1s to 8a7, SpirIt though un1versal exists onlT in in-
~iv1duals. SpirIt gives to the indivIdual reality_ That tRct be-
~omeB conscious to SpIrit itselt (tor man is an instanoe ot Spirit) 
~ t~ process ot unlveraallzat10n bf which the individual 1s ne-
~at.d~ or rather .ublated. ROTC., on the other hand, ma1ntains 
~hat the ult1Jaate pnneiple in realitJ is the Individual. To be 
real means to be &n indIvidual, to have a unique purpose. Indeed, 
iror Be70., he i& moa t real who is moat indivIdual, albeit that the 
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determdnations ot individuality take their sl~pe from the communal 
oontext at the Indt vidual. The Abaolute, who is :118 own context, 
i. U1 Indl vidual. lie finda hI. realization, cfJJ"talnlJ not in the 
negation ot finite lncUviduals, but in their pertaetion. .For RGT~ 
the lnd1"lthUll 1. It goo4. POI" Hegel, the indlvldual person is a 
perYeraion of tne unIyersal.> Although, admittedl" 1n e8sentlal-
~,ua good fI.nd bad are J;3ftan1ngful (lnly as polar opposites, it stande 
!clear trOll the contexts that ROTC. aooeptl5 the inai vidual and Hegel. 
rejects the mcUv1dua1 •. 
With that baato orientation toward the individual, noyce 
wanted hie syatem to embrace the Whole ot rea1l t7 ftot by exclusion. 
but by inolo10n. H. wanted to avoid any Nlductlonlsm." which, he 
felt, would narrow hia Yiev. ae want •• to exclude nODe of the 
1'acets 01' 11 yingJ 10Ye". cienee, emot i 0" , abatraetlorus, virtues, 
tl'Utha, ains. errors. Ue felt ttlAt aegel wrongq !'eduoed the mul-
tifarious dlacour8.a or ~ealit1 to one: 
His L!egel til great philosophical and systematio er>l"or 
la" not 1n 1ntroduolng logic into pas. lon, but in COD-
eelving the logio ot pas.lon as the only logic: ao that 
lOU in vain endeayor to get satiafaction trom Uegel's 
treatMent of" oute,. nature, or 8c1enc8, ot mathematics, 
or of arq ooldlJ theoretical topic. About all theae 
things be 18 1:waen8ely augge8tlve, but never ~lnal. 
w.. aY8t_, ... 8;yate., baa orumbled, but bia vital com-
proehenalon ot nUl" l1.t"e l"emaina ttorev81'.6 
Notwithstanding what haa been a ald, it J'GU8t be admitted that 
·5He.&1, Pheno_noloQ, p. 504. 
6JoSiah Hoyoe, The 8111'1t o:f Modern Pbilosop& (Boaton: 
r!ougbton, Mltrlln andTo'., t8l}2};-pp. 226-i?'!. 
Hegel's phllonophy did il'1£luence no)"c.te thought. 'rhel'. are cer-
tain eetln1te similarities 1n doctrInes. Both m8n were Id.alistu 
(in a sense alrtHtdy apfielfle4) with the :relIgious baokground ot' 
pl'oteatanthllrl (although of dltfel'ent denom1natlcna) and the philos-
ophical baokground or Kent, Picht., and Schelling.. Oertalnl1 RoyM 
was in contact with Hegel. In hi. many e.8.,8 and lectures on 
Hesel,1 Royce hR8 given good 1nd1e~tlon that he WQ8 well acquainte. 
with Hegel, eyen to the knowledge ot the man'~ p~rsonallt1.6 One 
·who haa read Regel 80 thoroU8bl1 could hardlY help but be influ-
enced bf his thought. If in no other form, be would at least find 
hllWSelt reacting to Hegel. So, it can be aatel,. aaid that Hegel 
pla1ed a detinite 1'010 in the mnturinr, ot Royce as Q. philosopher. 
The doctrine which moat Hadl17 comes to Jl1rld ita the gl'tultea1 
point ot s1m1l.arlt)" between the two Vl8n 18 that ot the Absolute. 
a-r the notion 01" the Absolute, both men hoped to 00_ to a compre-
hensive view and explanatIon 01" roa111:7. That doctrine is the co~ 
idea. tor both men, from whicb sprins all subsequent l"amificationa. 
!Because ot that, it mu.J' be saId that both veMa mon1ats 1n the sena. 
tha' tn., 80ugnt to explain the whole of re~llt.1 1n terms of one 
prlnotple. 'l'bay each d.n1~d r.va.tter--th.at is, a p!"inalplo of 1nde- .. 
ter-Jd.nancy tOl .. 1gn to 8pI~lt. 
~Dld. 
JosIah Royce, Lecture. on Mortem Ids",U •• (Ne", fln"len: Yale 
UnlYeratty Pre •• , 1919'. · - I I 
8R070., !!! 8211"1~ .2! Mftdem Phl1ol0P!5t. P. 196 !! .eg.. 
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Although their ultimate prinoiples vere substantially dit-
terent, tor one absolute universality, tor the other absolute in-
c.i1vidualltJ, their philosophies took on a similar struoture. '1'ruti: 
tor them was to be found on 17 in the vhole. The :tact isolated tX"CII 
the whole expression dlaaolv.s into Insigniticance and, so, unreal· 
it7. The whole :tor Hegel vas an absolute, unipolar intelligibili1J, 
Spirit. aeallt,., tor hi., could have only one torm. A.ll of real-
ity's meaning vaa to be derive4 from one unIversal idea, Spirit. 
the whole tor R07ce, on the other hand, waa an arbitrar;y absolute, 
determined by the tree choice ot the individual Absolute. Since 
the real is determined b.r the individual, reality could have been 
molded in all the infinite ways that the infinite number 01' pos-
sibles allowed. Prom the infinlte possibles, one retalit;r was cbos •• 
• either :Segel nor Royce allovs for a trall8cencient. God, tor 
aegel, ls mere17 the universal realit;r 01' individuals (thls author 
interprets :Segelts "Spirit" as his God). God is intel11gibility 
only in its concretion in individuals. In somewhat the same wa7, 
R070e'. God expHss.S his own being in teJ>MS 01' finite beings. Wit! 
his immanent determinations in the world, he also functions as a 
whole; that identities hi. a.a an lndi vidual God. 
The relation between R07ce and Begel vill not be pursued fur· 
ther, although more thoughts along those lines would be truitful 
tor an understanding 01' each man's philcsopbT. The influences ot 
:Segel on R07ce and the ditterence 01' the tvo vould require the 
treatment ot a book. 
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How that this first pa~t conce~ning the common labels for 
Royce's philosopbJ has been concluded_ the second part which deals 
with his favorable points_ will be taken. 
Some aspects ot Royce's philosopbJ impressed this author as 
~eing both original and signifioant. Pirst_ ROJce places ~.at 
stress on the individual. Indiyidualit, is t~e torm of ~ealitl. 
~nll b1 being an individual can a being be real. ROlce is so_what 
at odds with Segel on this point. Hevertheless_ Royce incorpo~atee 
~ith1n his notion ot individualitl the idea ot universalit,. The 
individual_ because he is constituted bJ his communitl_ contains a 
~iv.rsal oharacter. Only in bis wo~ld can man have anJ realitl 
~nd .igniticance. As Uei4egger would say, Da.ein finds its.lf 
thrown into being, structured in a world, and presented with pos-
9 
.ibili ties in terms of that world. Whether one i8 willing to agm J 
~ th ROlce that the world is its.lf t he expres.ion of Self, at 
~east it must be said that Royce baa brought to light that man is 
ontologicall, _ ocial. Whereas other philosophers have mentioned 
~bat man i_ bl nature sooial, tew have gone as tar as R010e in 
irorm.ing their philosophy ot being around tha t point. Acco~ding to 
ROJce, the meaning of maa's being evaporates when it i. presented 
abst»actlJ, tor abstractions tor.. mental constructs, tbe tools of 
9.a~tin seidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Maoqua~ri. and 
Ii:. Robina on (Hew York: Harper and Row, 1962). 
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be sciences. Man 11ve. embodied in a world. tiny true repreaenta 
ot man must be delineated 1n bi. social a tructure. 
The human .elt 1n ROToe'. pbiloaoPQr 1. always a unlque in-
Ivldual. Roell man 1n bia uniqueness takes on the Import ot real-
t,ta total expression, tor no otber •• It can take his ea.ential 
art in reallt7. True. the. elt tlnds Ita meaning 111 1ts role, 
18 not Nduced to a functionary. Man ri ••• above h.1s job 
world expres.lon preci •• ly beeau.e he i8 a .elt, a oonsclo 
Ing who appreCiates h1Ju,plt and others tor What they are. 
elou. person cannot be translate. b7 ·cog." Man In b1 ... 1t baa a 
Ign1t7 which detl.s all meohan1stlc 1nterpretations of' him, 
un~overs hi. dign1 t7 1n his tunotionlng. KUlt'reel1 choo 
Insofar as he aoquiNs hls ladl vidual Idantl t7, he has glw. 
o ~elt a dlgnlt1 not to De swallowad b, hi. external relation •• 
The human person i. give. the po •• lbll1t7 and direotion tor 
s growth 1n being wben tho Absolute thruats hi. Into existence 
1 th an ideal salf' to. hi. 60al. However, the human persCD DNS' 
" tb.e strongth ot bis own tree will aohlovo and pl'O&1"e.8 tow8J'd 
ae oan brlng about hi. own betterment by aotlng In ac-
ord wi th hi. purpose 1n 111"e. To a ot morally and t.c> brins about 
is personal growth, then, he must appreciate hi. own lnternal 
aning and those of otheraa. 
Se!4egger quotes Pa1!'m8n!d.s: "To gar auto no'ein eat1n te kd 
'"ina! (for thlnkinS and belng are the sa.)."lO Royce say. muoh 
laIble •• p. 215. 
-
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same. To be onesalr one must know the truth of onels own be-
and that at others. With such awareness man s a act. as to 
ring into reality rds further development as that person wh1ch 
1ntends b1m to be. 
The buman 8e11' i. lovee! by God. I'ot only, does God love a 
n because he fulfills a certain purp08e 1n His total expression, 
becauae God bas a true concern that this man does develop 
God ]mo.!. tully man t s internal mean1ng. He ssta up Ii 
or1d in. which this meaning is signifioant. a world where the man 
an flouriah in his full identity_ He in no way takes away the 
n's freedom. Such a God trull' loves man. And further. man is 
n • xpre.aion or God. As God loves himself, 10 too doe. Be love 
Aa an object ot the dlvine love, man takes on another 
imen810n 1n import. 
Royce .ets forth hi. definition ot sin in the framework In-
lcated above. Sin i8 a deliberate turning tram the truth of one-
elt and of other8 and aoting In that ignorance. Baaioally, then, 
1n 1a a denial ot being to oneaelf and othera and, so, to the 
blolut.,Goa Himselto Being is that which fulfills purpose. Sin 
enle. purpo.e or internal meaning. S1n, therefore, denies being. 
!he ugliness at aln, then, is to be tound 1n lts.lf and not 
o much In some transgresaion .. gainst an external law. Man bY' sin 
lna d.stro7s hi_elf and narrows hi8 contaot With the world, the 
orr.lativ. tactor to his real signl~lcance. In a1n man finds hi. 
and annihIlation. In God man finds his happ1nes. and 
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Another point to Royce's credit is that in his philoBopbJ 
love plays a leading role. Lo,. is the adhesive of the oommun1ty. 
Man ia bound to the world of selves insof"ar ES he appreciates in-
ternal meanin,;s and comports himself in acoord with that reali ty 
of others. In such a world of appreciation, man finds himself. 
As he wishes to himself his own good, so must he Wish to tre world 
its good. As he loves himself, so must he love tm world. 
In vain, then, does ll'l8.n seek full cognition through abstrac-
tion. An essential ingredient to true knowledge, i.e., "apprecia-
tion," 1s love. Love means to ",ish goodness or existence to some-
one. Only when a person enters into such a relatlonwlth another 
or even himself', can it be 8 aid that he truly appreciates that per-
son as a self", one who has an 1nternal meaning, a divine destIny 
to fulfil. 
Science, in R07ce t s aystem, takes a bs.ck seat to at knowledge 
Which is accessible to ord1na1'7 men. Royce would ell1phatlcall'7 de-
nT that the scient1sts, and even the protess! onal philosophers, art 
the on17 persons who live a truly human life and that tne rest ot 
:men are second-class citizens in the world. Every man can and 
should love himself" and his neighbor. 
Royce's ph1losopbJ contains maD7 answers to the problems of 
his daT, as well as the present. There was then in. America little 
aocial awareneas. It was the age of indiyidualism and unre.trietec 
private enterprise. SCience, boastful in its frf,sh starts and 
early successea, .sume4 a dictatorship oyer men's minds, whioh 
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l any in their ignoranoe humb17 aooepted. The very rich wanted to 
,I tar that way, b,. keeping the very poor very poor. The strong w ... 
rowdlng out tte weak freD. &nJ' rightful plac. 1n the 'World. In 
he faee of aueh a world, Royce thrust forth hia ph110.opbJ which 
I).ve to each man an identit7 wbich could be found on17 in hi. ao-
tal structure. Most lett Royc. to b.1. academic 011"01 •• and oon-
1nued in thelr m.undane affair. as th.,. had a1w8.7. done. A few 
aw that Royce's philosopbJ does contaln a true .ign1f1cance tor 
he world. The United Ratlons, the growing appreoiation ot the 
)urposel •• sne.s ot war in vie. ot nuolear weapona, the debt of 
)1!ogresslve countries to underdeveloped countries, the inoreasing 
ulNon,. between trade unions and management and capital, all the •• 
~oyce would regard as ooncrete instance. of bis philosophical max-
lU. All of those, although. the7 be in the .ocial dimension, bear 
~he utmost signiftoanoe far the individual of today. 
Royce's philosophy certainly bas ita faults. Throughout 
... 111. paper, however, the attempt has been not to belabor the .. lork 
py harping on the tallings of Roroe. Such a negative attitude, 
II think, would surelJ do inJutice to Royce in vlew of the worth-
~hl1" aspects to be to'Wld 1n his philo8oplq'. However, some or 
~o7C.ts tailings vill now bO indioate4. 
The first and toremost weakness, in the ovlnlon of this au-
thor, is that Royce mentioned no existential prinoiple intrinsic 
to a being. He hall nothing comparable to t he Thomistic notion of 
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~88.. A beag f cr Royce i. totall,. comprehenalble 1n 1'0rmal terms. 
~n other word., fl being 18 .rull,. known by underatanding, and there 
~s no need In human cop! tlon tor an a ct 01' judgment to posl t the 
~lng In exlstance. If a purpoae 18 ••• n tor a belng, then th. 
~lng 1. real. It has alread7 .e.n that tor ROJce tormal not •• 
~xpla1n Ind1.1dua11ty, whereaa Thom1s11 would aa7, in the case of 
~terlal belng, primar.y matter 1. the principle 01' individuation. 
~perlenoe, which la tn.t cognitive aotlvlt7 prIor to underatand-
~ng. 18 the prop€l1" c'op! tlonal le •• l tor ad! viduation in t he ca.e 
~t human knowledge. 
!lNe, fto7ce do.. aa..,. tbat tba Absolut. out 01' an Intin1 te 
lumber 01' posalble world. vl1la one Into being a. hia choaen •• 11'-
axpre •• 1on. However, R07ce tall. to brIq olear what 1 t 18 that 
~ltte .. ntiataa an actual trom a po.alble. !be .peoltl0 tn.tanc.s 
~t the total expres.lon, vlz. tlnlte a.lve., are gi.en their real-
~t7 In that t he7 tOl'llUlll,. particIpate in the total expression. In 
~ll~lns the whol., Go4 or.at •• the partioulu. 
thU., although It can be sald that the three transcendental 
WlUll, .. erum, bou\Ull are propel' to each IndivIdual, 
-
~he7 are meaninghl on17 1D. terma 01' operationa wl t.bin the whole. 
~oaua. o~ tbat, the individual'. value and dlgn1t7 aa a person, 
~n ROJ'oe' 8 phI1oaopbJ', tenda to t all outsIde tbe person b.1Juelt. 
, ... o_on Intepeat dictatea the personal, although, it must be 
~ald, In ROJoe'. phlloaoplq' It 1. juat a true to s.., that the o:r-
~anise4 Intereata ot IndivIdual. shape the oommon Intere.t. It 1. 
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a question ot prIority. It seema, however, that one must inter-
pret ROTce as sa71ng that the communit7 comes tlrst, then, con-
sequent17, comes the individual. Many would tind no tault with 
such a doctrine. .evertheless, this author cannot acoept Royoe's 
prlorltT, since he regards the Individual as tha souroe ot Identl 
realltT, and goodness from which the cODlllun.1t7 takes on substance. 
a bases his opInIon ultimate17 an the intrInsIc principle esse, 
-
trom whioh the transcendentals are derived. 
SIno. ROTce reJeota matter, he • an draw no 1'181d di.tinction 
etween human persona and thing. or antmal.. However, it one , 
thinks that he doe. get to the natures or things and anillal. throug 
their proper aocidents as theT appear both to scientifio and ordi-
rJ observation, then he must sal' that not every b.ing is a oan-
ciou. selt in the full s.nse that man is. But it one agrees with 
070e that his knowledge does not get to a prinoiple at operation, 
nature, then he must oonte.s that because ot his inadequate 
things mal' to a more perceptive observtPbe conscious 
all. This author does" not agree wi th ROTce here. 
ROTce's s7st .. is an endeavor to explain total17 in rational 
the whole at realIty. fhua, all truth and a 11 being must be 
~~Rent to his explanation. His prinCiple ot individuation can-
be non-intelligible, &S _tter Is. So, also, • ince God must 
be transcendent tot he explanatIon at the s7ste., the ground 
truth and bell18 must be IJIIUnent to the s7stem. In principle, 
must be comprehensIble In terms at the 87ste., and the rattanal 
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system itself' nlust sa,tL3t)' all ne&ds .for an absolute. The system 
i8 the ultimate., by which everrtll1ng must be defineCi and explained 
Howeyer, GoG, aa pure Act. 1s transcendent tothe finite order 
ae can never be tullY determined by a human system. for man's 
knowledge of Hi. is by nature limited to analogy. God is, however 
the efficient, tinal, a nd. exemplary cause of oreatures. He e an bE; 
80 regarded because He it 1s who endows cr-eatures w 1 th their O,,"L 
proper act of exiatence (esse). Their .finitude gives God. a trans-
cendent status ltIhich can be approached from the human 8 tandpolnt 
through analogr_ Insofar as a beins finitely participates by bis 
determined act of existence in the Infinite Act of Existence, God 
i8 immanent to oreation. 5everthele.s, in no sen.e is God the 
terial or intrinsio formal cause of creatures. That is tosay, 
God is not the oreature and the creature i. not God. Thus, He 
intains a strict ontologioal transcendence, wh11e yet being in-
volved in oreation. 
Also, Royce holds that all final causalIty 1s immanent to tht 
Pl'actical17 speaking, such f1nalit7 does not w urk. t\.ccord 
Royc., man finds in the world the full opportunity for ful-
illiag his purp ... , although an infinite ti.e is required. The 
driving toroe behind the selt-expressing is the growth in person. 
he norm and. impetus tor activi'ty, then, is the activity itself. 
lthougb there is samething of truth in that, the doctrine 1s in-
A transcendent with normatlYe ani mot!vating value is 
Il'leaning to hu.men life. otherwise, man would be oon 
10$ 
1: tbe 11111181' prograa81(;;f\ of •• If-cievelopment, instead of in terma 
t a subordinktion ot choice. in a rundamental comDdtment to a 
raneeena.nt. UltImately,.be would h6l.ve nowrutl'" to 60, unu he 
ould ba in lIttle hu.r1'J' to get there. In the concrete MOl-al alt-
tlon, when wan is 1"&084 with the option to do thl. p!I.rticular 
ood in api te of personal discomfort or to take the ettortles. path 
ownh111, Royce's doctrine ot an infinite .aries ot moral acta 
erri •• lIttle appeal 101" tbe c&uae ot righteousne... 1118 Neon-
ll1ation in term. 01' at.mit, 18 unintelligible and eluaive to the 
who aua t 11 'fa IIlOrall,- 1n t 1_. 
Gocl 18 manta ultbaat. tlnal cauae. He 1t 1. that gives mean 
to te.pol, .. l car.. and encla. Union 1A Hi. g1 vee _anirlg to the 
triving after good In tb1a life. Only a tI'anacendent God. can 
of th1nga i-.aflent to thls world. A trar.lS 
fmdent Ciod, w no raises MIl to h18 t'ull perfe.tion and happines8 
with bi., alone can make this te.poral17 t1n1te 11fe worth 
ROloa haa tal1e4 to br1dge t he gap be tween the teapol"al and 
eternal. Neve~thele8., it hi. pb11oBopn, 18 to be RBanin6tul, 
terapnral end eternal ordep, thouy"h diatinot, .mwst not remaIn 
.elate4 tztom one another. Begel, a180, ae" that there 18 a basic 
nadequaoJ 1n a moral1 t1 wh1ch ia •• t in .. tN_work where tne 
11 tel"'llal 1. suna.peel from t ha temporal. Royce t a human1.m maln-
talns tt~t tne 1ndividual t s willing or hi. purt.ot1on in time 18 
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identical ·wIth t hift Abao: ute '8 will in • tern! ty. Howevar, since 
th,. ultlm.-qte filotlve for moral activity 1s st.-It-development and, 
80. happln~ss. the tlll~U1IJc.ndent will oJ: the Absolute 18 in no way 
ope~Q.tiv. in !nunan meralIt,._ The Abaolute, ainoe n& hu set up 
the ideal .aU tor eaoh 1n.dl vidual, -7 be. aid t 0 be an. xempla17 
0&\188 to%' mortilectlvltJ, but not a tinal. The final oauae 18 man' 
perr.otlon and happin •••• whioh are 1mmanent in the rinite 'World 
and only coinoldental t 0 tM Absolute. 
One obv10us area in ROTce's pniloaoptlJ' wh10h -1' rall under 
cenaure 1. hla handline ot Nal1... HehardlJ puts realisll' a beat 
toot .t(>lIlW6l.t'd in h~ Ii contrived dialogue. Royce make. no 1I1ent1.on or 
the d.octr1ne ot Intentlunalit,. lUiS .. poasible answer ot l'eallstio 
.piatemoloa to hia problem of the total sepuatlon ot subject 
:trom object. ret, t he rejection or real1 .. in tavel' of idealism 
is at the h.eat-t or Royce's philosopl\Y' and slgn1ficant to all the 
partloulars o~ b1& philosophizing. 
R07c~ himaelt doaa not propos. a clear eplateaolo81, •• pecl-
&111 in hi. !!!. Worl.d and. !!:!. ... IIl ....d"""I .... v ...... i ..,ci....,UIl ........ l, II. 1n i5plte ot tne .tact 
tl1at now one knows 1. a verJ important aspect or the human persen. 
taIls to indica •• how, aocordlns to his ideallsm, communi 
about IlDlOfli men, altlWn.lgh this 18 moat indicative ot 
n'a 8001al nature. 
Those taults which bav. been toUD4 10 Royce'. pb1108opby are 
it ••• ma , m8Nl, a laok in the senae at not matcbing Thomlat1e 
Rather, the7 al"8 tault. beca~e ot lnauff1clency 1ntevna 
to his IITatem or becaU3: an ontological need rOI- EtxplEUlatlon Wid] 
ignored. 
RafCB'S PHILOSOPH! II P~C~I~ TODAY 
. .. -........ ., .. . 
As Royce exPe~1.nc6d the b~utal assassination or President 
Lincoln (Royoe was ten at the time), so too t he people of this age 
have w1tneseed the cpuel na.u-der or Plteslden1; Kennedy. In a matter 
of m1nutf). ,the &llIlOUllceruent (I~ Preaident !.'e_ed7'. death was sent 
throusbout the nation and, tben, thNmgbout the world b7 teletype 
end 1"&410. Soon atter. tba eye. of mdl11cna saw the dread1\tl ae~4 
by _ana of televislon. P1gura t1 .811' .p~a;"1ng, the al'teries of' 
cODlflun1cat10M have made the world a unlfied orgtlllism. At that 
tlme .. the whole 110%'14 emerged .. II one ill 1 ts sympathies tor the 
?~0std.ntfe family &nd bi. country. Grief and Indlgnation shocked 
the world Into A. 8el.r-aNare~.a which transcended the everyday. 
na~w interests or eaoh count~. The strong spir1ts of nat1onal-
~8l11 are now dlssolving, It seems, lUI the human %tao. apprecf.ates Itll 
~OIlUIlormeAS of plUtpoao.. President Kenned1' s assasainatlon was no-
~loed ~ all becaWllfl of the magnltude of the dlsruptlon involved; 
~,ll eon.ttlered It a l'llOst he1Doua cpl... It dlatuz-be:ci the world-
prder vl01ent17, Md .. so .. It IIRS regarded b;r all .. on .• viI. So, 
too, all ev11 d11lI"Upts the (]od-rlven oJ-der of the world and" more 
precisel,. acta againet the natuHR or In41vldttala o.r, 1n Royce '. 
J,erma. agalnat the IntePnal meanings of 8.,lves. 
The common manl.teRtatlon of t be sympath1e. expressed at Prt.Uh .. 
ldent Kennedy'. d.e~th boom all q'W\,l'ltere or the wC',.-ld, the 01"1:"'101.1 
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orgaalzatlor1s f<r world goverlUllent, the International Court of 
Justice, the growing appreciation among people throughout the 
tor the universal cnaraoterisrica of their tellow hu..n be-
allot this and more point to the taot that people are be-
their unit1 in the world. R010e would have 
thi. is a major step tuward selt-development. 
The purpose ot this thesis was to present Royce's notion of 
Individual hu.man selt', as he sets it rorth ill the second vol-
e of The World and the Ind.i \fidual. ______ J n _____ ~ .-....;. .................. __ 
The human 8 elt acquires 1 ts Iamortal and unique Identl ty 
hrough its .t"l:-ee selt-de"elop_nt in cmjtmction wi til the Absolute' 
Two dlarchtal princIples, ~he ideal selt which appears in 
t~ wor-ld which appears in time, converge in the h 
elf to gIve him the possIbI1it7 and direction ot bis existence 
Ultimately, sinoe the world itself is an e xpl"ession ot 
the two principles are redUCible to one, the Absolute'. 
A prime object of attention has been to Indicate the meta-
context tor R07ce's statements on the human person. Ro~ce 
mean to set up the constitution ot the human person In a 
urely ,.7chologloal or logioal framework. He wishes that his 
tat.menta be understood in te~ of a fUll and ultimate explana-
ion ot reallt,-. 
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